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A SHORT HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
AND ITS INTERSECTION WITH PRIVATE WATER LAW
Erin Ryan*
This Article provides a short history of the development of public trust
principles from early Roman and British law through modern U.S. law,
and then analyzes the tension between the public commons approach
underlying the public trust regulation of waterways and the privatization
premises of American laws that regulate private use of the water within
them. It begins by introducing the public trust doctrine as a creature of
common law, constitutional law, and perhaps as an underlying feature of
sovereign authority more generally, tracing its history from the Justinian
statement of the jus publicum through the British Magna Carta, and on to
early American affirmations in both state and federal supreme courts.
Over the centuries, the doctrine has evolved from an affirmation of
sovereign authority over resources to a recognition of sovereign
responsibility to protect them for present and future generations.
The Article then reviews the acceptance of public trust principles in
modern U.S. law, their ratification in many state constitutions, and the
questions that remain open about the extent to which the doctrine applies
at the federal level—including its role as a background principle in
constitutional takings analyses, and the extent to which it constrains even
federal sovereign authority. Finally, it explores the intersection of the
doctrine with state water allocation law, reviewing the broad mechanics
of the riparian and appropriative rights doctrines that establish theoretical
conflict with public trust principles. Conflict is especially pronounced
between the public commons model that underlies the public trust and the
privatization model embedded in the western doctrine of prior
appropriations, as demonstrated by distinct approaches to reconciling
them in California, Idaho, and Nevada. It closes with reflections on
alternative legal frameworks for protecting environmental rights
worldwide, including ancient Ottomon law and the Rights of Nature
movement.

*
Erin Ryan, Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor, Florida State University College of
Law; J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., Wesleyan University; B.A. Harvard University. I am
thankful to Ashley Englund, Amelia Ulmer, and Hayes Rule for terrific research assistance and to
Michael Wolf for his helpful suggestions about sharing legal history. This Article expands on a
shorter historical analysis in the first part of an earlier piece, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric
Trust: Navigating the Public and Private Interests in Public Trust Resource Commons, 10 GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39 (2019), based on a presentation I gave at the George Washington
Journal of Energy and Environmental Law Public Trust Symposium in 2018.
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INTRODUCTION
This article explores the development of public trust principles from
early Roman and British law through modern U.S. law as a public
commons approach to natural resource management, primarily with
regard to waterways. It then analyzes the tension between the common
pool approach underlying the public trust regulation of waterways and
the contrasting theoretical premises of American laws that regulate
private use of water within them—especially the privatization model
embedded in the western doctrine of prior appropriations, which assigns
perpetual rights to withdraw from the watercourse on a first-in-time basis.
The public trust doctrine, the protagonist of much modern
environmental advocacy in the United States, creates a set of public rights
and responsibilities with regard to certain natural resource commons,
obligating the state to manage them in trust for the public.1 It is thought
to be among the oldest doctrines of the common law, with roots extending
as far back as ancient Rome and early Britain, where it primarily
protected public values of navigation, fisheries, and commerce associated
with waterways.2 Over these hundreds and even thousands of years, the
common law came to recognize that some resources, such as navigable
waters, are so critical that they cannot be owned by anyone in particular—
instead, they must belong to everyone together.3 To prevent private
expropriation or monopolization of these critical public commons, the
government—be it the Emperor, the King, or later, the elected executive
and legislative branches—was entrusted to manage them on behalf of the
public.4
1 See generally Erin Ryan, The Public Trust Doctrine, Private Water Allocation, and Mono
Lake: The Historic Saga of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 45 ENVTL. L. 561 (2015)
[hereinafter Ryan, The Historic Saga]. See also ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE,
PRIVATE WATER ALLOCATION, AND THE MONO LAKE STORY (Cambridge Univ. Press,
forthcoming 2021); Erin Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust: Navigating the Public
and Private Interests in Public Trust Resource Commons, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
39 (2019) [hereinafter Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust]; Erin Ryan, Mary Wood,
Richard Frank, James Huffman, & Irma Russell, Juliana v. United States: Debating the
Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right to a Sustainable Climate, 46 FLA. ST. L. REV. ONLINE 1
(2018), https://www.fsulawreview.com/article/juliana-v-united-states-debating-the-fundamentalsof-the-fundamental-right-to-a-sustainable-climate/ [hereinafter Ryan, et al., Debating the
Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right]; Erin Ryan, Public Trust & Distrust: Theoretical
Implications of the Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477
(2001) [hereinafter Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust].
2 See J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1869); see also infra Part I(A).
3 See infra Part I(A).
4 See, e.g., Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (setting forth the seminal academic statement of the
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In the last century, the doctrine has gradually transformed from an
affirmation of sovereign authority over these resources to a recognition
of sovereign responsibility to protect them for present and future
generations.5 Especially in recent decades, it has evolved substantially
through U.S. common, constititional, and statutory law to address a
broader variety of natural resources and a broader scope of public values
associated with them, including ecological, recreational, and scenic
values.6 Today, the doctrine is frequently invoked in natural resource
management conflicts, some involving constitutional takings claims, and
some of which push the boundaries of previously recognized
environmental rights, such as the atmospheric trust movement’s appeal
to public trust principles in support of legal claims for meaningful climate
governance.7 Although it has not been matched in the courts, a vigorous
scholarly debate asserts its rightful application not only to state sovereign
authority, but also federal authority.8
Nevertheless, the doctrine remains most firmly rooted in its application
to water-related resources governed under state law,9 which has created
an interesting theoretical dilemma for American water law. For at the
same time that the public trust doctrine was developing to protect
commons values, a wholly independent system of law was evolving to
determine how much water individual users could take from these public
watercourses for their own private enjoyment. And these independent
water law doctrines do not always follow from the same theoretical
premise as the public trust doctrine.
The Eastern riparian rights system, imported directly from British
common law, assigns correlative rights to private riparian owners,
requiring all authorized users to share the resource with due regard to one
another’s interests.10 Deriving from a similar common-pool theory of
access to a shared resource, American riparianism has expanded public
rights and co-existed with the public trust doctrine with relatively mild
public trust doctrine as a modern legal tool to aid in the protection of natural resources); Michael
C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of
the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573, 580 (1989) (discussing the public trust doctrine as “a
democratizing force by (1) preventing monopolization of trust resources and (2) promoting natural
resource decision making that involves and is accountable to the public”).
5 See, e.g., Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 64.
6 See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court (Mono Lake Case), 658 P.2d 709, 726-27
(Cal. 1983); see also infra Parts I(B)-(C).
7 See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159
(9th Cir. 2020); see also Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60-64;
see generally Ryan, et al., Debating the Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right, supra note 1.
8 See infra notes 240-264 and accompanying text.
9 Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 625-26.
10 See infra Part IV(A) (discussing riparian rights regimes).
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legal friction.11 However, the prior appropriations doctrine, the dominant
rule of water allocation in the Western United States, allows whomever
first diverts from a watercourse to establish a right to continue taking the
same amount of water for that same use, potentially indefinitely.12 These
appropriative entitlements to water hold something closer to the force of
conventional private property rights, even if that water is coming from a
public waterway protected by the public trust doctrine.13
Figuring out how these two sets of legal rules intersect has caused no
small amount of trouble, leading to such famous conflicts as National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the epic battle over how much water
the City of Los Angeles could divert from distant Mono Lake, the eastern
watershed of the Yosemite High Sierra, despite serious ecological harm.14
Similarly, in Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resources
Control Board, litigants disputed how the public trust doctrine intersects
private agricultural rights to withdraw hydrologically connected
groundwater from the Scott River watershed, despite direct ecological
harm to the river.15 While these disputes have been the subject of deeper
scholarly inquiry elsewhere,16 this article provides the missing historic
and legal analysis underlying the core doctrinal conflicts between the
public trust doctrine and private water law. It further contrasts
California’s approach of balancing of public trust obligations and private
water rights with Idaho’s outright rejection of public trust principles as a
constraint on appropriative water rights, and the mixed approach taken
by the Nevada Supreme Court in recent litigation over Walker Lake.
This article offers a short history of the development of public trust
principles in the United States, providing foundation for the unresolved
relationship between the public trust doctrine and the contrasting
doctrines of private water allocation, riparian rights and prior
appropriations. It begins by introducing the public trust doctrine as a
creature of common law, constitutional law, and perhaps as an underlying
feature of sovereign authority more generally. Part I introduces the
historical origins of the doctrine, identifying the earliest statements of
public trust principles in ancient Rome and early British law. Part II traces
the formal reception of the doctrine in the United States through state and
Id.
See infra Part IV(B) (discussing prior appropriations).
13 Id.
14 Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d at 726–27 (adjudicating an epic water dispute amidst the conflict
between these two doctrines).
15 Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd. (Scott River Case), 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393,
399-403 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), review denied, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 9313 (Cal. Nov. 28, 2018)
(concluding that the public trust doctrine protected groundwater tributaries of navigable waters).
16 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
11
12
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ultimately federal law, including its intersection with the Equal Footing
Doctrine and the School Trust Lands conveyed to the states early in the
nation’s history by the congressional Lands Ordinance of 1785.
Part III reviews the acceptance of public trust principles in modern
U.S. law, including the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Illinois
Central Railroad, the ratification of the doctrine in many state
constitutions, and questions that remain open about the extent to which
the doctrine applies at the federal level. This analysis considers the role
of doctrine as a background principle in constitutional takings contexts,
and the extent to which it should be considered a constitutive constraint
on federal authority. It further reports on a long obscured debate over the
nature of the public trust doctrine among the Supreme Court justices
deciding an important 1987 takings case involving coastal lands, Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission.17
Finally, Part IV reviews the broad mechanics of water allocation law,
setting up the potential for conflict with the public trust doctrine. It begins
with a cursory review of the riparian rights doctrine of the eastern United
States, inherited from British common law. It then explores the prior
appropriations doctrine that developed later in the western states, and
which has clashed notoriously with the public trust doctrine in so many
western water conflicts. The analysis reveals how the unresolved
relationship between these doctrines creates ongoing friction in the water
governance regimes that follow them, with special attention to the distinct
approaches to managing this friction in the western states of California,
Idaho, and Nevada. Understanding these underlying legal theory conflicts
should enable us to better understand the core conflicts within water
disputes—and, ideally, prevent them in the future.
The Article concludes with brief reflections on the evolution of public
commons doctrines worldwide that take similar and contrasting
approaches to environmental rights, such as ancient Ottomon law and the
modern Rights of Nature movement. Each plays a different role in
helping us locate the dynamic equipoise between the conflicting values
at stake in contemporary environmental disputes.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Modern public trust principles, which assign state responsibility for
natural resources held in trust for the public, are most commonly
associated with American law.18 American legal scholars have long
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
See, e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1996) 1 SCC 388 (India), in 1 U.N. ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO ENVIRONMENT,
17
18
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debated the merits and the mechanics of the public trust doctrine, in a
robust discourse that matches enthusiastic support19 with deep concerns.20
NATIONAL DECISIONS 259 (1998) (referring to the California public trust doctrine, as expressed in
the Mono Lake case, in adopting similar public trust principles as a feature of Indian constitutional
law); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and
Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 701 (2006) (discussing American versions
of the public trust doctrine in general and referring to various expressions of the trust as “public
trust principles”).
19 The list of scholarship sympathetic to the public trust doctrine is too long to capture in one
footnote, but for a general overview, see generally MICHAEL BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD,
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2013);
Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1; Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra
note 1; Mary Turnipseed, Stephen E. Roady, Raphael Sagarin & Larry B. Crowder, The Silver
Anniversary of the United States’ Exclusive Economic Zone: Twenty-Five Years of Ocean Use and
Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust Doctrine, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (2009)
(advocating that the public trust doctrine apply to federal fisheries management); Klass, supra note
18 (advocating an integrated approach to the public trust doctrine that includes common law,
statutory, and constitutional bases); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Services and the Public
Trust Doctrine: Working Change from Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006) (arguing for the
protection of natural capital and ecosystem services through the public trust doctrine); Allan
Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the Attorney General as the Guardian of
the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 57 (2005) (advocating for the role
of the public trust doctrine in contamination cleanups); Richard Roos-Collins, A Plan to Restore
the Public Trust Uses of Rivers and Creeks, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1929 (2005) (advocating for the wider
adoption of public trust principles in water rights regulation); Dale D. Goble, Three Cases / Four
Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807 (2005)
(advocating for the role of the public trust doctrine in application to wildlife); William D. Araiza,
Democracy, Distrust, and the Public Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust
Doctrine, and the Search for a Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385 (1997)
(identifying a foundation for the public trust doctrine in many state constitutions); Epstein, infra
note 163, at 428–30 (supporting the public trust doctrine from a libertarian, property rights
perspective as a natural limitation on government power, comparable to restrictions on eminent
domain); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 269 (1980) (advocating for the use of public trust principles in judicial review of public land
management decisions); Blumm, supra note 4; Sax, supra note 4; see also sources cited infra note
240.
20 See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Public Trust Doctrine: A Conservative
Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 49 (2006) (suggesting reconstruction of the
public trust doctrine in response to libertarian and property rights critiques); Randy T. Simmons,
Property and the Public Trust Doctrine, PERC POLICY SERIES-39 (2007) (discussing the public
trust doctrine as a threat to private property rights); Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine:
An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239, 274–76 (1992) (criticizing the public trust
doctrine’s effects on private property rights); Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist
View of Joseph Sax’s Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts
on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209 (1991) (arguing that the doctrine is too
weak to contend with broader environmental challenges); Thompson, infra note 207, at 1532–33
(criticizing use of the doctrine to avoid just compensation for what otherwise looks like a taking);
James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (arguing that the doctrine lacks foundation in the police power and critiquing
the judicial role under the doctrine as antidemocratic); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions
of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA. L. REV. 631 (1986) (arguing that the property-based concepts of the doctrine are a
problematic approach for accomplishing environmental protection in comparison with the
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However, the central idea of the public trust has roots in some of the
oldest doctrines of the common law tradition.21 Many accounts date its
origins to early British law, and some go all the way back to ancient
Rome.22 Versions of the public trust doctrine now operate in every
American state and many other nations,23 but the underlying theory
evolved over a time horizon so long that it can be easy to miss the breadth
of its historical reach. This Part presents the conventional historical
account of the development of the modern public trust doctrine, anchored
with references to contemporaneous events to convey its remarkable
journey through history.
A. The Roman and Byzantine Empires: The Institutes of Justinian
The earliest written accounts of public trust principles go astonishingly
far back in time. For context, in the Sixth Century A.D., King Arthur’s
victory in the battle of Mound Badon was slowing the Saxon conquest of
England, and Yang Jian was reuniting China at the advent of the Sui
Dynasty.24 At about the same time, the Byzantine Emperor Justinian I set
stewardship approach of modern environmental statutory law); James L. Huffman, Trusting the
Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson,
Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 565 (1986) (questioning the policy motives of propublic trust scholarship).
21 See, e.g., Sax, supra note 4, at 475 (laying the seminal academic foundations for the public
trust doctrine as a tool to aid in the protection of natural resources, and crediting its origins to early
British and Roman law). But see James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths—A History
of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 20-23 (2007) (critiquing the
conventional account of this history).
22 See J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1869) (translation from the
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, by the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian I). But see J.B. Ruhl & Thomas
McGinn, The Roman Public Trust Doctrine: What Was It, and Does It Support an Atmospheric
Trust, 47 ECOLOGY. L.Q. 117 (2020) (critiquing the standard account of the Justinian roots of the
doctrine).
23 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1
(2007) (comparing eastern states’ public trust doctrines); Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative
Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (comparing western
states’ public trust doctrines); Michael C. Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the
Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the
Saxion Vision, 45 CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 741, 760 (2012) (reviewing the adoption of public trust
principles internationally);ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER
ALLOCATION, AND THE MONO LAKE STORY, Chapter VII-VIII (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming, 2021) (discussing examples of public trust principles in operation around the nation
and around the globe).
24 King Arthur, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/King-Arthur
(last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (noting that the battle at Mount Badon is believed to have taken place
sometime
that
century);
Sui
Dynasty,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sui-dynasty (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (noting that Yang Jian
reunited China in 581).
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to work codifying Roman Common Law of the previous era, for the
combined purpose of fortifying legal education and restating the law for
enforcement purposes.25 In the INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, published in
533, he documented the Jus Publicum, a principle addressing the
common ownership of certain natural resources:
By the law of nature these things are the common property to
mankind–the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of
the sea.26
Thousands of years later, it is hard to know exactly how these
principles helped govern the Roman Empire,27 but this commanding early
statement of public commons has echoed through common law
jurisprudence ever since, in both judicial decisions and constitutional
affirmations.28 Analogous principles of public commons ownership,
especially pertaining to waterways,29 also appear in civil law countries
with legal codes that draw on ancient Roman law, including France,
Spain, and other post-colonial nations with related legal systems.30
B. Early British Law: The Magna Carta, Forest Charter, and Common
Law
Some Jus Publicum principles were later incorporated into early
British law, beginning with the Magna Carta. In 1215, a few decades
before Marco Polo set sail for Asia and shortly after the sack of
Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade,31 King John of England issued
25 H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 492-93 (3d ed. 1972).
26 J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1869).
27 See Huffman, supra note 21; Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 22.
28 See ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER RIGHTS, AND SAVING
MONO LAKE (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2021), Chapter VIII (“The Evolving PTD”)
(tracing the evolution of the doctrine in the U.S. and international jurisdictions).
29 The public trust doctrine is most often invoked in application to waterways, but it is worth
noting that the first item on Justinian’s list—”the air”—is an important element in the modern
atmospheric trust movement, which attempts to deploy public trust principles in the context of
climate governance. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d,
947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
30 See, e.g., Glenn J. Macgrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law:
Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines that Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA.
S T.
U.
L.
REV.
513,
536-45
(1975),
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?Article=1801&context=lr (reviewing Roman-inspired
doctrines of public ownership over navigable waterways in Spain, France, and other civil law
countries).
31 Marco Polo, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/MarcoPolo (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (dating Marco Polo’s eastern voyage as beginning in 1271); Sack
of Constantinople, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Sack-ofConstantinople-1204 (last visited Sept. 23, 2019) (discussing the sack of Constantinople during the
Fourth Crusade in 1204)..
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the Magna Carta (“Great Charter”), promising his rebellious barons that
he and all future sovereigns would operate within the rule of law.32
Although the Magna Carta was unsuccessful in the first instance, it
eventually provided the foundations of the modern English legal system,
and it is widely credited as a progenitor of Western democracy and
constitutional law.33 In addition to declaring the sovereign subject to the
rule of law, the Magna Carta also set forth rights to speedy justice, trial
by jury, and against unusual punishments.34 It also incorporated into
English law certain principles of Roman common law, including
elements of the Jus Publicum. For example, Chapter 33 of the Magna
Carta required the removal of all weirs in the Thames and Medway Rivers
“throughout the whole of England” that interfered with fishing or
navigation.35 The Magna Carta, negotiated among a common pool of
aristocrats, effectively decreed these navigable waters a public commons
for these purposes.36
The Charter of the Forest, added to the Magna Carta in 1217 by King
Henry III, further protected public rights to access natural resources on
certain undeveloped royal lands (not just forests), and it remained in
effect for centuries thereafter.37 Re-establishing traditional rights of
public commons that had been eroded by William the Conqueror, the
Forest Charter promised that the King would not interfere with
commoners’ rights to graze animals, forage, plant crops, and collect
lumber on open lands subject to Forest Law.38 Notably, this law still

32 See ANDREW BLICK, BEYOND MAGNA CARTA: A CONSTITUTION FOR THE UNITED
KINGDOM (2015).
33 See
Doris
Mary
Stenton,
Magna
Carta,
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Magna-Carta (last modified Mar. 16, 2020).
34 Magna Carta, ch. 20, 39-40 (Eng. 1215), https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta1215?shelfitemviewer=1.
35 Magna Carta, ch. 33 (Eng. 1215), https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/magna-carta1215?shelfitemviewer=1; see also Michael C. Blumm & Courtney Engel, Proprietary and
Sovereign Public Trust Obligations: From Justinian and Hale to Lamprey and Oswego Lake, 43
VT. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018). A weir is a barrier that crosses a river in order to alter its flow
characteristics, usually changing the height of the water level, and often to control water flow into
associated reservoirs, lakes, or ponds.
36 Blumm & Engel, supra note 35, at 7 (discussing the implementation of Justinian public trust
principles in the Magna Carta).
37 Magna Carta, ch. 12 (Eng. 1217); see Sarah Nield, The New Forest: Ancient Forest and
Modern Playground, in 2 MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW 287, 294 (Elizabeth Cooke ed.,
2003); Anne Bottomley, Beneath the City: The Forest! Civic Commons as Practice and Critique,
5 BIRKBECK L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2018); Nicholas Robinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in the 21st
Century, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 83, 84-87 (2020).
38 See Dr. John Langton, The Charter of the Forest of King Henry III, FORESTS AND CHASES
OF ENGLAND AND WALES C. 1000 TO C. 1850, St. John’s College Research Centre,
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/forests/Carta.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).
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governs the New Forest territory in southern England.39 While these
provisions do not necessarily follow from the Justinian references to
common property in air, water, and coastlines, they do express an early
affirmation of what would develop into more modern public trust
principles of public rights in natural resource commons.
Early British common law also made reference to public trust
principles in a series of cases and authorities affirming sovereign
authority over submerged tidelands.40 In 1611, the same year that Galileo
first observed sunspots41 and Shakespeare’s The Tempest debuted,42 the
King’s Bench held that while the beds of non-navigable waterways could
be privately held, navigable waters were owned by the sovereign for
public use.43 Sir Matthew Hale, in his renowned 1670 Treatise on English
Maritime Law, later described sovereign ownership of tidelands in an
account of the three different kinds of coastal land: (1) that under the royal
right (or police power), (2) that available for public navigational access,
and (3) that which was privately owned.44
British law primarily applied the sovereign ownership principle to
submerged lands beneath coastal tidelands, the navigable waterways of
primary value there. American law would ultimately apply the doctrine
to submerged lands beneath all navigable waterways, including large
watercourses to which there were no true analogs in Britain, such as
America’s Great Lakes and enormous river systems.45 As detailed further
in Part II, the doctrine made its first American appearances in key state
court decisions during the early nineteenth century, and it was affirmed
repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court by that century’s end. While these
decisions created uniquely American law going forward, they drew
heavily on the historical roots of the doctrine in these pre-American
times.46

See Nield, supra note 37, at 303.
See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 727-30 (1986).
41 Sunspot, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/science/sunspot (last
visited Sept. 24, 2019).
42 The Tempest, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/TheTempest (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
43 The Royal Fishery of Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540, 543 (K.B. 1611).
44 Matthew Hale, A Treatise De Jure Maris et Brachiorum Ejusdem, reprinted in STUART A.
MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE AND THE LAW RELATING THERETO, 370, 371-72 (1888).
45 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
46 See infra Part II.
39
40
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C. Critiquing the Conventional Account
While this account of the historical roots of the doctrine is frequently
repeated in American jurisprudence and scholarship,47 some regard the
conventional account with skepticism.
Some scholars debate the extent to which ancient legal practice does
or should provide justification for the evolution of the modern public trust
doctrine. In copious writings on this point, Professor James Huffman has
been especially troubled by the conventional account. He concedes that
some claims typically made by public trust proponents are consistent with
early Roman and British law—for example, that public trust resources
must be made available for certain defined public uses, such as fishing
and navigation.48 However, he argues that other central claims by public
trust proponents—for example, that certain natural resources require
public ownership by their nature, and that the state cannot alienate them
or use them inconsistently with these public rights—are unsupported by
his readings of either Roman or English law.49 He notes that the Magna
Carta, created by British Barons to protect their own property rights, was
never meant as a declaration of rights for commoners.50 Huffman
maintains that unlike contemporary statements of the public trust
doctrine, the relevant portions of the Magna Carta protected only British
nobility, rather than the general public, and that this weakens the
historical foundations so often relied on by modern public trust
proponents.51 He further argues that the King’s prerogatives under British
common law did not include trust-like responsibilities to the public until

47 See, e.g., Scott River Case, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 399 (“From ancient Roman roots, the English
common law has developed a doctrine enshrining humanity’s entitlement to air and water as a
public trust.”); MICHAEL BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 12-13, 57-82 (2013) (identifying the Roman
roots of the public trust doctrine); Sax, supra note 4, at 475 (1970); Ewa M. Davison, Enjoys Long
Walks on the Beach: Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of Pedestrian Passage over
Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV 813, 830-31 (2006) (invoking the Justinian roots of the public
trust doctrine).
48 Huffman, supra note 21, at 18-27.
49 Id. Huffman points to the text that follows the previously quoted portion of Justinian’s Jus
Publicum for support of his argument that Roman law protected private rights as strenuously as it
did public rights. The rest of the passage reads: “No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the
sea-shore, provided he respects habitations, monuments, and buildings, which are not, like the sea,
subject only to the law of nations.” J. INST. PROEMIUM, 2.1.1. (T. Sandars trans., 4th ed. 1869)
(translation from the INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, by the Byzantine Emperor, Justinian I).
50 Huffman, supra note 21, at 19-20; see also Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the
Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L. J. 13, 39 (1976); Glenn J. MacGrady, The
Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance,
and Some Doctrines That Don’t Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 513, 554 (1975).
51 Huffman, supra note 21, at 20-21.
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well into the 19th century.52 His argument, in essence, is that while
American courts ground public trust decisions in this story we like to tell
about the Roman and British roots of the doctrine, the story we are telling
ourselves isn’t really true.53
Professors J.B. Ruhl and Tom McGinn have also examined the
meaningfulness of modern invocations of the Justinian statement of the
jus publicum, especially by those who would apply it to protect the air
commons in climate change litigation.54 They begin with skepticism,
questioning the unclear relationship between this twenty-one word
passage and actual Roman legal practice during the relevant historical
period.55 They worry that modern atmospheric trust advocates may
overstate the environmental values associated with the historical premise,
when the Roman public trust progenitor arose primarily to protect
economic interests.56 Nevertheless, they find more support for modern
public trust scholars’ reliance on the Roman doctrine than Huffman, and
ultimately contend that the public trust principle commonly credited to
Justinian probably extends even further back in time.57
Classics Professor Bruce Frier reports with sympathy on the ongoing
debate between legal scholars who turn to Roman law in support of
modern invocations of the public trust and critics, like Huffman, who
argue that the Roman sources were misinterpreted and “therefore used to
grant a false patina of antiquity to a deeply suspect theory justifying
public seizure of private property.”58 He concedes that gaps in the
available historical sources leave some Roman law principles unclear or
ambiguous.59 Nevertheless, his analysis of the ancient Roman concept of
res communes (“common things”) provides, if not a perfect analog to the

52 Id. (citing Carter v. Murcot, 98 Eng. Rep. 2162 (1768), and quoting F. POLLOCK & F. W.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1952)).
53 Ruhl & McGinn, supra note 22 at 123-24 (explaining that Huffman’s objections to Roman
roots is because “the res communes omnium (RCO) resources were ‘things common to all’ mostly
because their supply was abundant and demand for them slight,” and “until late in the Empire,
Roman law made no distinction between the public and the personal status of the ruler”).
54 Ruhl and McGinn, supra note 22.
55 Id. at 136-39, 171-74.
56 Id. at 167-71 (“[T]he surviving sources suggest to us that Roman policies are not linked, at
least not in any obvious sense, to the protection of the environment. Instead they are keyed to the
exploitation of certain natural resources for economic motives.”).
57 Id. at 130, 163 (noting that “[t]he Institutes was an attempt to summarize and synthesize
Roman law going back many centuries before its publication” and was “stitched together from
excerpts drawn from the works of two juristic predecessors,” Guis and Marcian); see also Bruce
W. Frier, The Roman Origins of the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 J. OF ROMAN ARCHAEOLOGY 641,
643 (2019).
58 Frier, supra note 57, at 641-42 and n.7.
59 Id. at 642.
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modern trust, a Roman groundwork for what the trust has become.60
Although he does not believe that the Roman concept is identical to the
modern public trust doctrine, he nevertheless concludes that the two share
distinctive and important features, especially in application to navigable
waterways:
[T]he Anglo-American concept of a trust, with its division of
ownership between a trustee who holds property and a
beneficiary who has an equitable title in it, is not altogether
unlike—at least in the case of res communes that the jurists
describe as public, namely larger rivers and the seashore—the
division between public ownership and the common ‘ownership’
of beneficiaries[.]61

He finds the parallel between the Roman and modern doctrines further
reinforced by the Roman jurists’ insistence that the res communes
doctrine is rooted in Natural Law, that set of unchanging moral principles
that forms the basis of human-made laws and government.62
This adherence to the Natural Law origins of the Roman doctrine is
reminiscent of the modern understandings of the public trust, discussed
further in Part III, as a quasi-constitutional doctrine.63 Like the constraints
of Natural Law, this interpretation holds that the public trust doctrine
operates as a constraint on sovereign authority, and one that the sovereign
cannot easily extinguish.64
Although elements of the historical critique have merit, their
arguments remain a footnote to the mainstream historical account. Even
Ruhl and McGinn, in the most rigorous interrogation of the Roman origin
story to date, find support for the continuity of public trust principles to
ancient common law. And while Huffman is right that the Magna Carta
was conceived as a political device by British nobles to protect their own
aristocratic privileges, and not those of the general public—these
unstately origins did not dull the worldwide inspiration that the Magna
Carta would eventually provide for the development of universal civil
rights. For the same reason, its aristocratic origins should not necessarily

60 Id. at 647. Frier discusses the distinction between res communes omnibus, property singled
out only for general use, and res communes omnium, property that is commonly owned. Id. at 646.
Notably, this distinction between public property and common property survives in the modern
public trust doctrine’s distinction between the jus publicum and jus privatum. Cf. Glass v. Goeckel,
703 N.W. 2d 58 (Mich. 2005) (distinguishing between the private title that a sovereign may convey
and the public trust “easement” over submerged lands that remains with the public).
61 Frier, supra note 57, at 647.
62 Id.
63 See infra Part III (“Contemporary Overview”); infra text accompanying notes 240-255
(discussing the public trust as a constraint on sovereign authority).
64 Id.
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tarnish the force of this historical account on the development of more
universal public rights in natural resources. The ideals set forth in the
Forest Charter addendum to the Magna Carta, which unequivocally speak
to commoners’ rights in natural resources, may come even closer to the
modern public trust principles that would ultimately evolve in the United
States and elsewhere.65
In the end, whether or not critics like Huffman are right about the
veracity of this public trust history—it is a story that American jurists
have been telling for a very long time. As detailed below, the American
courts that adopted the public trust doctrine have been referring copiously
(and perhaps defensively) to its roots in both British and Roman law for
two hundred years.66 Notwithstanding critique of the Roman and British
origin story, the modern public trust doctrine today finds its most
important jurisprudential roots in the only body of law with precedential
significance in the United States—the long chain of American judicial
decisions and other sources that affirm its role in American law from
early through modern times.
II. RECEPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
The doctrine of sovereign authority over submerged lands was
received in the United States through the individual states’ reception of
British common law and began making appearances in litigation within a
few decades of the nation’s founding. The emerging public trust doctrine
established sovereign ownership over the submerged lands beneath
navigable waterways, usually up to the mean high-water mark (the point
representing the maximum rise of the waterbody at issue over the
surrounding land).67 In the expanding territory of the new United States,
where the shores of the sea are matched by thousands of miles of
navigable rivers and enormous freshwater lakes, the doctrine was
expanded from the British focus on coastal tidelands to the resources

65 Nicholas Robinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in the 21st Century, 10 GEO. WASH. J.
ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 83, 84-85 (2020).
66 See infra Part II.
67 The mean high-water mark (MHWM) is the primary tool for measuring the boundaries
between public and private lands beneath navigable waterways, but some jurisdictions use other
boundaries for certain waterways, such as the ordinary low water mark (OLWM) for non-tidal or
littoral waterways, designating the lowest point of rise by the waterbody over its submerged lands.
See Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1517 (2007). For example, the first case discussed below, Arnold v. Mundy, refers to the OLWM line.
Some jurisdictions that adopted OLWM boundaries early in their history later changed to MHWM
by statute. See Katrina M. Wyman and Nicholas R. Williams, Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L.
REV. 1957, 1964-65 (2013).
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associated with navigable waterways more generally.68 The doctrine was
first recognized by state courts during the early 1800s, not long after
Thomas Jefferson’s tenure as the third President of the United States and
Lewis and Clark’s expedition of the western territories.69 By the end of
that century, the U.S. Supreme Court had affirmed it several times as an
underlying feature of the American common law landscape.
This Part reviews key moments in this early history of the American
doctrine,70 tracing its arrival in state courts in the early nineteenth century
through the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal treatments of the doctrine near
the turn of the twentieth century. These cases had consequential stakes,
such as the rightful ownership of Chicago Harbor71 and submerged lands
on the Columbia River in Oregon.72 Yet among the first cases to turn on
the public trust doctrine had lesser stakes, a New Jersey dispute over the
ownership of submerged oyster beds.
A. State Common Law: Arnold v. Mundy
In 1821, the former French Emperor Napolean Bonaparte died in
exile,73 and the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first American
court to discuss the sovereign ownership of submerged lands in Arnold v.
Mundy, a case about who was entitled to harvest oysters from a riverbed.74
The plaintiff had purchased a farm alongside a navigable river, in
which he planted oysters below the ordinary low-water mark75 and staked
off the bed.76 When the defendant took oysters from this bed, the farmer
argued that he was trespassing on submerged lands that had long been

64

See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892).
Thomas
Jefferson,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Thomas-Jefferson (last visited Sept. 24, 2019) (dating
Jefferson’s presidency between 1801-09); Lewis and Clark Expedition, ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Lewis-and-Clark-Expedition (last visited Sept.
24, 2019) (dating Lewis and Clark’s journey to find a route to the Pacific Ocean as beginning in
1804).
70 For an even more thorough history of the early American doctrine, see generally Harrison C.
Dunning, The Public Right to Use Water in Place, in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 28-1 to 33-22
(Amy C. Kelley ed., 2009).
71 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
72 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1894).
73 Napoleon
I,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Napoleon-I (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
74 Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
75 For discussion of mean high and ordinary low water marks, see generally James L. Huffman,
supra note 21, at 1, 18-27. It is noteworthy that the oyster bed here was below the ordinary low
water mark, indicating that it would meet the requirements of public ownership under either
measuring approach.
76 Arnold, 6 N.J.L. at 9-10, 65–66.
69
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claimed and defended by his predecessors in title.77 Although the farmer
was able to show surveys proving the previous private claims to these
submerged lands, and to prove that these predecessors in title really had
driven would-be competitors away from them, the defendant argued that
all citizens of New Jersey had a common right to take oysters from a
navigable river where oysters would grow naturally.78
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Kirkpatrick determined that the
farmer could only prevail in his suit if he had proper title to the oyster
bed79—but that this farmer could not do so, because his private claim
extended only to the landward side of the water’s edge.80 The Chief Jusice
held that the land beneath navigable waterways81 is common property,82
and that proprietors have no more power than the English crown to
convert lands beneath them into private property.83 Referencing Justinian,
the Chief Justice characterized common property as “the air, the running
water, the sea, the fish, and the wild beasts,” and held that title to these
were in the sovereign, to “be held, protected, and regulated for the
common use and benefit.”84 Writing with strong tones of judicial gravity,
he concluded:
The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with
the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well
ordered society, make a direct and absolute grant of the waters of
the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would
be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free
people.85

With these words, he became the first American jurist to tie the public
commons element of the public trust doctrine to the orderly functioning
of democracy. Not long thereafter, in 1842, the U.S. Supreme Court
approved the reasoning of Arnold v. Mundy in a similar case about the
ownership of submerged oyster beds, Martin v. Waddell.86

Id. at 9, 66.
Id. at 66.
79 Id. at 11-14.
80 Id. at 67.
81 Id. at 12 (specifying “the navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, the ports, the bays,
the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the land under the water, for the purposes of
passing and repassing, navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of the water
and its products”).
82 Id. at 71-72.
83 Id. at 78 (indicating that any grants purporting to convey this common property were therefore
null and void).
84 Id. at 71.
85 Id. at 78.
86 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) (“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became
themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and
77
78
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B. Affirmation by the U.S. Supreme Court: Martin v. Waddell
The United States Supreme Court first formally invoked the public
trust doctrine in 1842, the same year that the Chinese and British Empires
ended the First Opium War.87 In Martin v. Waddell, the Supreme Court
affirmed the sovereign ownership of navigable waters and their
submerged resources in another dispute over oyster beds.88 Here, the
plaintiff claimed ownership of tidelands whose chain of title traced back
to a grant to the Duke of York from King Charles of England, made to
facilitate the establishment of the early American colonies.89 Yet the
Court held that the plaintiff proprietors could not prevail, because even a
royal grant was subject to public trust rights of common fishery for the
common people.90 In affirming the public trust principles of sovereign
ownership of navigable waters and the submerged resources therein,91 the
Court referenced the presence of the doctrine in English law as far back
as the Magna Carta:
The lands under the navigable waters within the limits of the
charter passed to the grantee, as one of the royalties incident to
the powers of government; and were to be held by him, in the
same manner, and for the same purposes, that the navigable
waters of England and the soils under them are held by the
Crown.
The policy of England since Magna Charta (for the last six
hundred years), has been carefully preserved—to secure the
common right of piscary for the benefit of the public.
[I]t would require very plain language in these letters-patent [to
the Duke of York] to persuade [the Court] that the public and
common right of fishery in navigable waters, which has been so
long and so carefully guarded in England, and which was

the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered by the
Constitution to the general government.”); see also id. at 409 (“The country mentioned in the letters
patent, was held by the king in his public and regal character as the representative of the nation,
and in trust for them.”).
87 Opium Wars, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/OpiumWars#ref1262803 (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
88 Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842).
89 Id. at 407-18.
90 Id. at 416-18.
91 Id. at 418. The court concludes that the former proprietors had no right to alienate the
submerged land as private property in conflict with the people’s rights to common fisheries. The
original royal charters to the Duke of York, later surrendered to these proprietors, conferred the
same powers as those held by the crown, which protected common rights of fishery absent clear
contrary language (not evident here) to convert the land under navigable waters to private property.
See id. at 413-14.
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preserved in every other colony founded on the Atlantic borders,
was intended, in this one instance, to be taken away.92

Three years later, the Supreme Court applied the same principles in a
more consequential case resolving a dispute over the ownership of
submerged lands in Alabama and Georgia.93
C. The Public Trust on Equal Footing: Pollard v. Hagan
In 1845, the year Texas was admitted as the 45th U.S. state and Henry
David Thoreau took up residence at Walden Pond,94 the Supreme Court
considered the relationship between the public trust and equal footing
doctrines. In Pollard v. Hagan, the Court rejected an argument that
territory in Alabama that had originally been ceded by Spain should not
be subject to the public trust doctrine,95 partnering the common law
concept of sovereign ownership with the federal constitutional doctrine
of “equal footing” between the states.96 The equal footing doctrine holds
that all states in the union, regardless of the timing and circumstances of
their entry, possess the same sovereign rights and responsibilities as the
original thirteen states, including those regarding submerged lands.97
In this case, the issue turned on whether the common law public trust
doctrine would apply in Alabama, a state whose territory had come into
the United States by Treaty with the King of Spain, a non-common law
sovereign. The plaintiff claimed ownership by a U.S. Patent to submerged
land under the Mobile River, which had originally been ceded to the
United States by Spain under the 1819 Adams-Onis Treaty, also known
as the Florida Treaty.98 When the case went to trial, the jury was
instructed—consistent with the public trust doctrine—that if they
believed the land was below the high-water mark at the time Alabama
was admitted to the union, then the patent was void and the plaintiff had
no title.99 When the jury found against the plaintiff, he appealed on
grounds that they had been improperly instructed.
Id. at 368, 413-14.
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
94 Texas, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/place/Texas-state (last
visited
Sept.
24,
2019);
Walden
Pond,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Walden-Pond (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
95 Pollard, 44 U.S. at 228-29.
96 Id. at 222-23.
97 Id. at 222 (“The manner in which the new States were to be admitted into the union, according
to the Ordinance of 1787, as expressed therein, is as follows: ‘And whenever any of the said states
shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such state shall be admitted by its delegates into
the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever.’”).
98 Id. at 225.
99 Id. at 220.
92
93
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In his appeal, the plaintiff argued that because the land had been
conveyed to the U.S. by Spain, and not England, the fuller powers of the
Spanish Crown over navigable waters should govern his ownership
rights.100 The Spanish Crown had held full title to these submerged lands
without the encumbering public trust obligations of British common law.
By his reasoning, those were the unencumbered rights that had been
conveyed to the United States, which later conveyed those same
unencumbered rights to him.
In a critical moment for the American public trust doctrine, the Court
rejected this argument. Instead, it determined that when Alabama was
admitted to the Union, it entered on “equal footing” with neighboring
states, such as Georgia, and thereby succeeded to all the same rights of
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain as these other states.101 The
Court explained that the U.S. had not succeeded to the specific rights the
King of Spain had held previously, but came into possession of the new
territory subject to the institutions and laws of its own government:
It cannot be admitted that the King of Spain could, by treaty or
otherwise, impart to the United States any of his royal
prerogatives; and much less can it be admitted that they have
capacity to receive or power to exercise them. Every nation
acquiring territory, by treaty or otherwise, must hold it subject to
the constitution and laws of its own government, and not
according to those of the government ceding it.102

The court held that the land under navigable waters was reserved to the
states, that new states have the same sovereignty and rights over
navigable waters as did the original states, and that the United States did
not have the power to grant the lands claimed by the plaintiff.103
Pollard v. Hagan is an especially important case because it sheds light
on some of the questions that continue to preoccupy public trust
jurisprudence today. By establishing that all lands passing into U.S.
possession are encumbered by the public trust regardless of their source,
it lends credence to contemporary arguments that the public trust doctrine
constrains federal as well as state sovereign management of public trust
resources.104 After all, if all submerged lands within the United States are
subject to the trust regardless of what sovereign possessed them
beforehand, what distinguishes submerged lands under federal
Id.
Id. at 223, 228-29.
102 Id. at 225.
103 Id. at 230.
104 See infra Part III.C; see generally Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1234 (D.
Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
100
101
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jurisdiction? Some scholars also read the case to suggest that the doctrine
has quasi-constitutional features, drawing from a well of constitutive
authority that departs from more ordinary doctrines of law. Accordingly,
some argue that Pollard reveals the constitutional dimensions of the
doctrine as an attribute of sovereignty that transcends mere common law
status.105 Others have argued that the public trust doctrine expresses a
fiduciary aspect of the constitutional equal footing doctrine.106
D. The Definitive Supreme Court Statement: Shively v. Bowlby
By the late nineteenth century, it was well established among
American courts that the state holds navigable waterways in trust for the
public.107 In 1894, the Supreme Court made its most definitive statement
of the public trust doctrine as an attribute of sovereign authority in Shively
v. Bowlby, a case quieting title to submerged lands beneath a statesanctioned wharf on the Columbia River in Oregon.108
The case resolved a dispute over the ownership of submerged lands
along the Columbia River near its delta into the Pacific, in what would
eventually become the city of Astoria, Oregon.109 The defendant’s
riverbed claim was challenged in a complicated fact pattern involving a
countervailing claim by successors in title who had built a wharf on the
same land.110 The original claimant had taken title under a grant from the
U.S. Congress to U.S. territorial lands before Oregon had become a state,
and the case turned on whether that grant had conveyed not only the
uplands, but also the submerged lands below the mean high-water
mark.111
In a meticulous exposition, the Court traced how the doctrine of public
rights in submerged lands had progressed from English common law into
the original thirteen states and those that had followed, identifying the
overwhelming majority that had explicitly adopted the public trust. Citing
both Martin v. Wadell and Pollard v. Hagan, the Court once again
105 Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property
Law, 19 ENVTL. L. 515, 516-524 (1989). But see James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common
Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997)
(arguing that both the equal footing doctrine and public trust doctrine should be understood as flip
sides of the same federal common law coin). For further discussion of the relationship between the
equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine, see infra notes 248-253 and accompanying text.
106 See generally Michael C. Blumm, Harrison C. Dunning, & Scott W. Reed, Renouncing the
Public Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q.
461 (1997).
107 See Blumm, supra note 4, at 580.
108 152 U.S. 1, 53-54 (1894).
109 Id. at 7, 9.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 52-55, 57.
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affirmed that submerged lands had been held by the English King for the
benefit of the public,112 that those rights became vested in the original
states after the American Revolution,113 and that all U.S. territory everafter would be subject to the same public trust limitations on submerged
lands.114 The Court held that whenever territory came into the U.S. by
whatever means, the same public ownership of submerged lands below
the mean high-water mark passed to the federal government, held in trust
for the new states that would be carved from this territory.115
As new states entered the Union, they therefore did so on equal footing
with the original states, holding the same rights and responsibilities in
submerged lands.116 While Congress could have conveyed title to
submerged territorial land before statehood, it could only have done so
for appropriate public purposes, and did not do so by general law.117
Otherwise, sovereign grants of riparian and littoral lands to private
owners remain subject to the paramount right of navigation inherent in
the public.118
Having traced the full history of the doctrine from British law through
the American Revolution and forward since then, it concluded that the
disputed lands near the Columbia River Delta “include[] no title or right
in the land below high-water mark; and the statutes of Oregon, under
which the defendants in error hold, are a constitutional and legal exercise
by the state of Oregon of its dominion over the lands under navigable
waters.”119 But the force of its exposition immediately before this holding,
summarizing its exhaustive analysis, is worth quoting at length:
Lands under tide waters are incapable of cultivation or
improvement in the manner of lands above high-water mark.
They are of great value to the public for the purposes of
commerce, navigation, and fishery. Their improvement by
individuals, when permitted, is incidental or subordinate to the
public use and right. Therefore, the title and the control of them
are vested in the sovereign, for the benefit of the whole people.
At common law, the title and the dominion in lands flowed by the
tide were in the king for the benefit of the nation. Upon the
settlement of the colonies, like rights passed to the grantees in the
royal charters, in trust for the communities to be established.
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 14-15, 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 49, 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 52, 57-58.
Id. at 58.
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Upon the American Revolution, these rights, charged with a like
trust, were vested in the original states within their respective
borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the constitution to
the United States.
Upon the acquisition of a territory by the United States, whether
by cession from one of the states, or by treaty with a foreign
country, or by discovery and settlement, the same title and
dominion passed to the United States, for the benefit of the whole
people, and in trust for the several states to be ultimately created
out of the territory.
The new states admitted into the Union since the adoption of the
constitution have the same rights as the original states in the tide
waters, and in the lands under them, within their respective
jurisdictions. The title and rights of riparian or littoral proprietors
in the soil below high-water mark, therefore, are governed by the
laws of the several states, subject to the rights granted to the
United States by the constitution.
The United States, while they hold the country as a territory,
having all the powers both of national and of municipal
government, may grant, for appropriate purposes, titles or rights
in the soil below high-water mark of tide waters. But they have
never done so by general laws, and, unless in some case of
international duty or public exigency, have acted upon the policy,
as most in accordance with the interest of the people and with the
object for which the territories were acquired, of leaving the
administration and disposition of the sovereign rights in
navigable waters, and in the soil under them, to the control of the
states, respectively, when organized and admitted into the Union.
Grants by [C]ongress of portions of the public lands within a
territory to settlers thereon, though bordering on or bounded by
navigable waters, convey, of their own force, no title or right
below high-water mark, and do not impair the title and dominion
of the future state, when created, but leave the question of the use
of the shores by the owners of uplands to the sovereign control of
each state, subject only to the rights vested by the constitution in
the United States.120

In so holding, the U.S. Supreme Court formally ratified, then and
forever, the general provenance of American lands submerged in
navigable waters (below the mean high-water mark) as owned by the
sovereign and held in trust for the benefit of the public.

120

Id. at 57-58.
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E. Contrasting School Trust Lands
The foundational nature of the public trust distinguishes lands
protected under this doctrine from other important lands set aside for
public purposes early in the nation’s history, such as the lands conveyed
in trust to the states by the congressional Land Ordinance of 1785 to
support public education.121 In these earliest days of the republic,
Congress allocated to new states a designated quadrant of land in each
undeveloped township for the express purpose of providing for public
education.122 Under the Land Ordinance, new states were surveyed and
divided into townships of thirty-six square miles, each composed of
thirty-six sections.123 The sixteenth section of each township was set aside
as “school trust land,” to be held in trust by the state and used specifically
for the maintenance and benefit of both primary schooling and public
universities.124 Some states used trust lands for the construction of actual
schools, but most managed the lands to provide income in support of
education. 125 For example, Colorado’s state trust lands mostly generate
income for public education through the development of oil and gas
reserves, though some are also managed for hunting, fishing, and
recreation.126
The state school trust lands seem familiar, since they also represent an
ownership interest in land allocated to the state as trustee to provide the
public with specific benefits. However, unlike public trust lands held by
every state under the equal footing doctrine, state trust lands were
designated in only about half the states, mostly during the westward
expansion following the Revolutionary War.127 Like public trust lands,
school trust lands were conveyed for a specific public purpose. Yet public
trust lands belong to the state without a specific conveyance, held in trust
as an attribute of state sovereignty, whereas school trust lands were
created by legislative statute and conveyed without constraint on
subsequent alienation. In fact, Congress later explicitly authorized states

121

28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 375-78 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,

1933).
122 Peter W. Culp et al., State Trust Lands in the West, Fiduciary Duty in a Changing Landscape,
LINCOLN
INST.
OF
LAND
POL’Y
2
(2015),
https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/state-trust-lands-in-the-west-updatedfull.pdf.
123 Id. at 8-9.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 16, 53-62.
126 Id. at 45, 55.
127 Id. at 4-5 (noting that school trust lands were designated in 23 states and that “the practice
of granting reserved lands in support of schools began when Ohio was admitted to the Union in
1803, and continued throughout the process of state accession”).
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to sell school trust lands to generate revenue, prompting many states to
alienate trust lands for one-time yields that provided only short-term
benefits for public education.128 Today, nine western states maintain the
lion’s share of the 46 million acres of school trust land that remains,129
and another fourteen continue to hold some of the originally granted lands
in trust, though some holdings are now very small.130
Moreover, and most importantly, school trust lands are logically
subjugated to the temporally and conceptually prior public trust doctrine.
While the question has not often been litigated, Louisiana courts most
clearly clarified the relationship in concluding that designated school
trust lands cannot include navigable waters, which are already held by the
state in trust for all citizens.131 Policy arguments for the primacy of the
public trust doctrine also appear in the legal literature.132 Legal
recognition of the distinction follows both from history and from the
uniquely nonfungible nature of the public commons protected by the
public trust doctrine. After all, there are many means to generate support

128 Id. at 11 (noting that state trust lands restrictions evolved over time, and that after Congress
granted states authority to sell land to generate revenue, “most early states rushed to sell their lands
in the frenzy of frontier land disposals,” and that “[w]hile this supported early school systems, it
provided few lasting benefits for schools”). Some states, however, enacted their own constitutional
limits on the short-term disposal of school trusts lands. See id. (discussing Michigan’s approach to
ensuring a sustainable source of education funding from school trust land revenue); Hill v.
Thompson, 564 So. 2d 1, 14-15 (Miss. 1989) (holding that school trust lands could not be leased,
as this would constitute a donation of public trust lands thus violating the state’s own constitution).
129 See Culp et al., supra note 122, at 3 (“While most state trust lands have long since passed
into private ownership, the remaining 46 million acres are a significant resource, concentrated
primarily in nine western states.”); id. at 6 (“State trust lands comprise approximately 46 million
acres of land spread across 23 of the lower 48 states, primarily west of the Mississippi River. These
landscapes span the forests and mountain ranges of the Intermountain West and the Pacific
Northwest, the grasslands and rich farmlands of the Midwest, and the arid deserts of the
Southwest.”).
130 See id. at 15 (“Twenty-three states continue to hold some state trust lands from their original
grants: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Several of these states have retained
only a small fraction of the original lands—Nevada, for example, holds only around 3,000 acres of
its original 2.7-million-acre grant. By contrast, Arizona, Montana, and Wyoming each still have
more than 80 percent of their original land grants.”).
131 State ex rel. Plaquemines Par. Sch. Bd. v. Plaquemines Par. Gov’t., 652 So.2d 1 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1994).
132 See John B. Arum, Old-growth Forests on State School Lands—Dedicated to Oblivion?—
Private Trust Theory and the Public Trust, 65 WASH. L. REV. 151, 163-66 (1990) (arguing for the
explicit imposition of public trust obligations on school trust lands to better align with public
concern for resource conservation); Sean E. O’Day, School Trust Lands: The Land Manager’s
Dilemma Between Educational Funding and Environmental Conservation, A Hobson’s Choice?, 8
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 194-95, 213-17 (1999) (advocating that school trust land be managed to
better advance environmental protection, and suggesting ways in which school trust obligations
may be subsidiary to the public trust doctrine and other environmental regulations).
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for public education, but the values associated with navigable waterways
are not easily transferable or conferred by other means.
III. CONTEMPORARY OVERVIEW: A COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
Over the two centuries since the doctrine was formally received in the
United States, the American public trust doctrine has gradually evolved
from a doctrine about sovereign authority, focusing on the prerogatives
of ownership, to one that is also about sovereign responsibility,
emphasizing the sovereign’s specific obligations to the public with regard
to public trust resources. This is evident in two separate spheres of
American law: (1) the ongoing development of the common law trust,
and (2) the independent development of the doctrine as a feature of state
constitutional law. Today, there are growing points of intersections
between the public trust doctrine and federal law, some of them
controversial. This Part briefly reviews these three separate realms of
public trust evolution, beginning with an old decision that is still the U.S.
Supreme Court’s leading public trust case, the 1892 decision of Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.133
A. With Power Comes Responsibility: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois
Although Shively v. Bowlby was the U.S. Supreme Court’s most
definitive treatment of the public trust doctrine, its most famous statement
of the doctrine arose in Illinois Central, a decision issued two years
earlier.134 In 1892, the same year Sir Arthur Conan Doyle published The
Adventures of Sherlock Holmes,135 the Supreme Court provided a crisp
statement of the traditional American public trust doctrine that is
routinely quoted by the cases that have followed:
[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters . . . in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.136

146 U.S. 387 (1892).
Id.
135 The
Adventures
of
Sherlock
Holmes,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Adventures-of-Sherlock-Holmes-by-Conan-Doyle
(last
visited Sept. 24, 2019).
136 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 452.
133
134
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Yet note how the theme of state ownership of trust resources is limited
by the fact that the state only holds title in trust for the public. With great
power comes great responsibility.
The public trust’s doctrinal infrastructure shows that it doesn’t just
protect the public nature of these common resources—it also assigns
responsibility for their protection—specifically, to the government.
Analogizing to the property law construct of the legal “trust,” the
government (acting as trustee) is responsible for protecting the resource
(or trust res) for the public benefit.137 With very narrow exceptions,138 the
trustee can neither alienate the trust resource nor allow its destruction.139
This means that, when it is acting as trustee, the government does not own
trust resources in the same way that it owns more ordinary public lands
under its jurisdiction. Instead, it holds the resource “in trust” for the real
legal owner—the public it serves. Some scholars have described the
difference as one between state “sovereign” and “proprietary” ownership,
in which resources held as sovereign property are subject to the trust,
while those subject to proprietary ownership may be alienated by the state
on terms more like ordinary private property.140
The public is the ultimate beneficiary of the trust, and as in
conventional trust relationships, the public can hold the government
accountable for failure to manage trust resources in accordance with its
responsibility as trustee.141 If they feel the government is failing its
obligations as trustee, citizens can usually seek to enforce their rights in
court.142 In this critically important way, the public trust doctrine acts not
just as a grant of sovereign authority with regard to trust resources, but
aso as a limit on sovereign authority with regard to the same resources,
137 See, e.g., Richard M. Frank, The Public Trust Doctrine: Assessing Its Recent Past and
Charting Its Future, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 665, 667 (2012) (“Simply stated, however, the doctrine
provides that certain natural resources are held by the government in a special status—in ‘trust’—
for current and future generations.”).
138 See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (approving limited dispositions
of trust resources to private parties to improve navigation or when discrete parcels can be disposed
of without impairing the public interest in the remaining trust resource); see also Michael C.
Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 660-62 (2010) (discussing the Illinois Central exception, “authoriz[ing]
privatization of trust resources when 1) the conveyance furthered public purposes, and 2) there was
no substantial effect on remaining trust resources”).
139 Frank, supra note 137, at 667 (“Government officials may neither alienate those resources
into private ownership nor permit their injury or destruction.”).
140 See DAVID C. SLADE ET AL., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO WORK 6–8 (1997)
(describing the distinction between jus privatum, which the state may convey public lands to a
private interest, and jus publicum, which it may not).
141 See Sax, supra note 4, at 473 (describing how citizens have brought lawsuits to enforce the
trust obligations of the state).
142 Id.
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constraining what the government can and cannot do to ensure against
private expropriation and monopolization.143
In Illinois Central, the Court not only affirmed sovereign authority
over submerged lands, it clarified the nature of the sovereign’s
obligations to the public as trustee of those lands.144 And indeed, the facts
of Illinois Central case demonstrate just how powerful that public trust
obligation can be.
To give a sense of the enormous power packed by this seemingly
simple doctrine, consider the striking facts of the case. This nineteenth
century legal mêlée followed a fraught moment in Illinois history, when,
in 1869, the state legislature conveyed the better part of Chicago
Harbor—the most valuable submerged lands in all of Lake Michigan—
to the Illinois Central Railroad, a private company.145 After a series of
complicated transactions in which the legislature granted Illinois Central
rights to construct infrastructure along the dry and wet sides of the
lakeshore,146 the legislature enacted the Lake Front Act of 1869,147 which
conveyed ownership rights in perpetuity to the railroad.148 To accomplish
this, the legislature had to first override a gubernatorial veto, by which
the Governor of Illinois had attempted to prevent the conveyance.149
Whether the legislative grant was an example of flagrant government
corruption or a well-intended plan to spur economic development,150 the

143 See Brief for Law Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari
at 1–2, 7, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (No. 14-405), cert.
denied, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (discussing the public trust doctrine as an attribute of sovereignty).
144 Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 568.
145 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 438-39 (describing “a grant by the State in 1869 of its right and title to
the submerged lands, constituting the bed of Lake Michigan”).
146 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust
Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799, 818–23 (2004)
(discussing the railroad’s improvements to the lakeshore; see also Crystal S. Chase, The Illinois
Central Public Trust Decision and Federal Common Law: An Unconventional View, 16 HASTINGS
W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 113, 126 (2010).
147 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 860–77 (discussing the enactment of the Lake
Front Act of 1869); see also H.R. Journal, 26th Cong., at 239-40 (Ill. 1869) (noting the Senate’s
passage of the House’s version of the bill, enacting the Act).
148 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 800-01 (describing the Lake Front Act, by which
the state legislature “awarded the Illinois Central both a portion of the lakeshore for a new depot
and over one thousand acres of submerged land for the development of an outer harbor for
Chicago”). Professors Kearney & Merrill explain that “[t]he practical effect of the Lake Front Act,
in terms of the market for harbor facilities in Chicago, was to authorize the creation of a large,
privately owned harbor facility in the lake.” Id. at 881.
149 Id. at 874-75.
150 See Sax, supra note 4, at 490 (arguing that the conveyance could not be justified by any
public benefit); Kearney & Merrill, supra note146, at 893 (“[A]lthough the documentary record
from 1869 cannot be said definitely to establish . . . corrupt means . . . it probably leans in that
direction.”).
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people of Illinois were not delighted.151 Public reaction ranged from
dubious to furious.152 While some hoped that associated economic
development would eventually confer public benefits, the gift smacked
of political patronage and cronyism, and it generated considerable
outrage.153 When both the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Times
condemned the conveyance, legislative support for the deal began to
collapse, and the Illinois House and Senate created committees to
investigate the possibility of corruption.154
When the legislative session finally turned over, the new legislature—
responding to this significant public pressure—attempted to undo what
the previous legislature had wrought.155 In 1873, legislators sought to
reestablish public control over the full harbor by repealing the original
conveyance.156 Ten years later, when the railroad continued to assume a
proprietary posture toward the harbor, the state sued for declaratory relief
to establish public ownership of the lakebed.157 Now Illinois Central was
the outraged party, and it fiercely resisted the state’s claim.
In court, the Railroad argued that the new legislature could not repeal
the Chicago Harbor conveyance made by the prior legislature.158 It argued
that these submerged lands were now its private property, conveyed by
the Lake Front Act of 1869,159 and that the state lacked authority to
reclaim property that had already passed in a fully executed
conveyance.160 As the railroad argued, the state could not formally convey
a thing of such value and then just take it back, as if the conveyance had
never happened!161
Of course, even if the legislative grant were sound, it is worth noting
that in actuality, the state could have just taken it back—though not as if
the conveyance had never happened. The state’s power of eminent
151 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 840-42, 875-76 (describing public outrage over
the conveyance).
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 889-90, 908-09 (describing legislative committees created to investigate potential
corruption).
155 See id. at 911 (indicating the legislative turnover that followed); Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 449
(“On the 15th of April, 1873, the legislature of Illinois repealed the act.”).
156 Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 449.
157 Id. at 439.
158 Id. at 438-39.
159 Id. at 450.
160 Id. at 450–51 (“[The Act] is treated by the counsel of the company as an absolute
conveyance to it of title to the submerged lands, giving it as full and complete power to use and
dispose of the same . . . and not as a license to use the lands subject to revocation by the state.”
(emphasis added)).
161 As my students have often remarked, the Railroad’s claim would have been well understood
by any toddler under the hallowed doctrine of “No Backsies!”
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domain would have allowed it to reclaim the property for public use, so
long as it paid just compensation to the railroad.162 Indeed, other scholars
have written about Illinois Central as though the most important issue in
the litigation was the state’s liability for an uncompensated taking163—a
legal issue in which the public trust doctrine might also play a role164—
but that claim was not a subject of the actual litigation.165 Instead, Illinois
Central staked its most important claim on the power of the original
legislative grant and the lack of state authority to undo it (together with
subsidiary claims for rights incident to its ownership of riparian lands and
a later claim that the repeal interfered with rights under its original
charter).166
Nevertheless, the state had a formidable response, deploying public
trust principles as a novel legal shield. Illinois argued that its power to
undo a fully executed conveyance was immaterial under the
circumstances.167 Conceding that there might have been a legal problem
if there really had been a legal gift, the state argued that in this case, there
was not an actual problem, because—thanks to the public trust doctrine—
there had not been any actual gift.168 Even if it looked as though the
previous legislature had conveyed the bed of Chicago Harbor to the
Railroad, in fact, no such thing had happened.169 The bed of Chicago
Harbor was subject to the public trust doctrine—held by the state in trust
for the public—and therefore, as a matter of law, could not be alienated
way.170
The state argued that the previous legislature had lacked the power to
make a gift of lands encumbered by the public trust.171 Such an act would
be ultra vires—literally, beyond the authority of the state—at least
without taking more heroic measures to clarify why such an unusual
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 422–26 (1987);
Lloyd R. Cohen, The Public Trust Doctrine: An Economic Perspective, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 239,
246 (1992).
164 See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the Property Owner’s Reasonable
Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J.
121, 137–40 (2006) (discussing use of the public trust doctrine to defend takings claims by defusing
the reasonableness of claimants’ expectations).
165 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 811 n.54 (explaining this popular misconception).
166 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 438–39 (1892) (stating the railroad’s claims).
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 See id.
170 See id. at 453-54 (“The trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only be
discharged by the management and control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot
be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the State for the purposes of the trust
can never be lost.”).
171 See id.
162
163
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conveyance was in accord with its public trust obligations.172 As a result,
there was no actual gift, and accordingly no harm in repealing it, and
therefore, no legal foul.
Accepting this argument, the Supreme Court affirmed that the
operation of the public trust doctrine had prevented the legislature from
ever alienating the harbor in the first place.173 The railroad had never been
the actual owner of the submerged lands, and so its legal claims ended
there. In this way, Illinois was able to successfully reestablish public
ownership of Chicago Harbor on the grounds that the public trust doctrine
acted as a limit on the state’s legal ability to casually convey trust lands.174
More importantly, Illinois Central demonstrated that the public trust
doctrine functions not only as a grant of affirmative state authority over
submerged lands, but also as a limit on state authority with regard to the
management of those lands. This is because the state is required to
manage them as trustee for the public benefit.175 The public, as the
beneficiary of this trust relationship, is entitled to call the state to account
for errant management choices in the courts. If members of the public
believe the state has failed its obligations as trustee, they can pursue their
legal claim under the public trust doctrine in court.
The premise affirmed in Illinois Central provided critical impetus for
the development of the common law public trust in nearly all of the
United States.176 Today, the common law public trust doctrine offers
meaningful protection of navigable waterways as public commons in
nearly every state. 177 Over the years, as plaintiffs across the country have
172 Id. at 455-56 (“The ownership of the navigable waters of the harbor and of the lands under
them is a subject of public concern to the whole people of the State. The trust with which they are
held, therefore, is governmental and cannot be alienated, except in those instances . . . of parcels
used in the improvement of the interest thus held, or when parcels can be disposed of without
detriment to the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.”).
173 Id. at 453. Of note, Justice Field explained that the trust extended to Chicago Harbor because
it was “a subject of public concern to the whole people,” leaving open the possibility, embraced by
later scholars and litigants, that the same rationale should apply to other commons resources also
vulnerable to monopolization. Id. at 455. See also MICHAEL C. BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA
WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 7273 (2013) (discussing Illinois Cent. and various scholars’ interpretations of the case).
174 See Ill. Cent., 146 U.S. at 453, 463.
175 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (holding that the “title and the control of [submerged
lands] are vested in the sovereign, for the benefit of the whole people”); see supra notes 107-120
and accompanying text (quoting Shively more fully and discussing its significance).
176 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 146, at 802-03 (outlining the history of the case in light
of its importance in modern public trust theory).
177 See generally Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust
Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN. ST. ENVTL.
L. REV. 1 (2007) (comparing eastern states’ public trust doctrines); Robin Kundis Craig, A
Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights,
and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53 (2010) (comparing
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litigated to vindicate and define public trust obligations, the doctrine has
developed differently from one state to the next.178 Some states protect
different resources under the doctrine and some assign different levels of
protection to trust resources,179 but at a minimum, most share the common
principle of sovereign authority over lands beneath navigable waters held
in trust for the public.180 Following the Mono Lake National Audubon
Society decision and the cases that paved its way in California law, the
doctrine has become increasingly associated not only with the protection
of such traditional uses as boating, commerce, fishing, and swimming,
but with environmental protection as well.181 In some jurisdictions, the
public trust doctrine has also been applied to protect other resources,
including groundwater, wildlife, and atmospheric resources.182

western states’ public trust doctrines); ALEXANDRA B. KLASS & LING-YEE HUANG, RESTORING
THE TRUST: WATER RESOURCES AND THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, A MANUAL FOR ADVOCATES
21–24
(2009)
(comparing the sources of various states’ public trust doctrines); MICHAEL C. BLUMM ET AL., THE
PUBLIC
TRUST
DOCTRINE
IN
FORTY-FIVE
STATES
(2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2235329 (analyzing the public trust doctrines
of 45 states); LING-YEE HUANG, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, RESTORING THE TRUST: AN
INDEX OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND CASES ON WATER
RESOURCES
AND
THE
PUBLIC
TRUST
DOCTRINE
(2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478512.
178 See sources cited supra note 177.
179 See id. For example, most states protect public access to submerged lands below the highwater mark, but New Jersey protects access to dry sand beaches as well. Matthews v. Bay Head
Imp. Ass’n., 471 A.2d 355, 363 (N.J. 1984).
180 See sources cited supra note 177.
181 See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (finding increasing recognition
that one of the most important uses of tidelands protected by the doctrine is “the preservation of
those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as
open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and
which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area”); Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d 709
(affirming the application of the public trust doctrine to protect the environmental values at Mono
Lake).
182 See, e.g., Scott River Case, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (following the Mono Lake rule in applying
the public trust doctrine to protect the non-navigable groundwater tributaries of a navigable
waterway); Owsichek v. Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 495 (Alaska 1988)
(“[C]ommon law principles incorporated in the common use clause impose upon the state a trust
duty to manage the fish, wildlife and water resources of the state for the benefit of all the people.”);
Betchart v. Dep’t of Fish & Game, 158 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1106 (1984) (“California wildlife is
publicly owned and is not held by owners of private land where wildlife is present.”);
Environmental Protection Act of 1970, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1202(1) (1970) (extending
the public trust, via statute, to authorize legal actions “for the protection of the air” in addition to
water and other natural resources) (repealed and replaced by the Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1) (1994)).
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B. State Constitutions: Florida, Hawaii, & Pennsylvania
The common law public trust doctrine continues to play an important
role in the regulation of public waterways, but the trust concept has also
developed independently as a matter of state constitutional law. Public
trust principles have been incorporated into a number of U.S. state
constitutions,183 even where the doctrine is also part of that state’s
common law.184
Some constitutionalized versions look very similar to the common law
statement of the public trust doctrine affirmed in Illinois Central. For
example, Florida’s Constitution includes a provision that recognizes
public ownership of critical water commons and confers traditional
protections for submerged lands beneath navigable waters:
The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the
state, which have not been alienated, including beaches below mean high
water lines, is held by the state, by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for
all the people.185
Constitutionalization in other states have further broadened the scope
and effect of the trust, sometimes far beyond the Illinois Central versions.
For example, Article XI of the Hawaii Constitution declares that the state
holds all of its natural resources in trust for the public, including (but not
necessarily limited to) land, water, air, minderals, and energy sources:
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its
political subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty
and all natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy
sources, and shall promote the development and utilization of these
resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural
resources are held in trust by the State for the benefit of the people.186
The Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania
Constitution reveals a similarly expansive conception of the public trust.
Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution adds natural,

183 See sources cited supra note 177; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy
and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive Guidance, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 863, 866
(1996) (“[T]he ‘public trust’ doctrine which plays a constitutional role in most states even though
less than a handful of states refer to the trust in the constitution itself.”).
184 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 18, at 714; Jeffrey S. Silvyn, Protecting Public Trust Values in
California’s Waters: The Constitutional Alternative, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 355 (1992)
(comparing California’s common law and constitutional public trust rights and concluding that the
latter may be more expansive).
185 FLA. CONST. ART. X, § 11.
186 HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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scenic, historic, and esthetic values to the body of the state’s public trust
resources:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation
of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.
Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the
benefit of all the people.187
In contrast to the simple affirmation of public ownership of natural
resources in Florida, the Hawaii and Pennsylvania doctrines establish a
substantive commitment to protecting the environmental values
associated with public trust resources, and they partner that commitment
with an unequivocable ethic of intergenerational equity. Like the
California Supreme Court in the Mono Lake case,188 the Hawaii Supreme
Court has established that its public trust doctrine is not displaced by the
statutory law of private water allocation.189 However, it goes even further
than California, and far further than the traditional Illinois Central
version, in holding that all water resources—and not just navigable
waterways—are protected by the doctrine.190
Demonstrating the power of this substantive commitment, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court famously invoked the Environmental
Rights Amendment to overturn a state law preventing local governments
from regulating horizontal shale drilling and hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”) through zoning.191 Fracking is commonly used to extract
natural gas from the rich Marcellus shale resources of the state, but its use
can threaten water resources with contamination and overuse. Through
their land use planning ordinances, many state municipalities had
disapproved fracking operations that they feared would negatively impact
local water supplies.192
In the 2014 decision of Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, a
plurality of the Pennsylvania high court invalidated a state statute that had
been enacted to preempt local regulation of fracking operations through

PA. CONST. Art. I, § 27.
Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d at 712, 727-28.
189 In re Water Use Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch), 9 P.3d 409, 445 (Haw. 2000)
(holding that the state water code “does not supplant the protections of the public trust doctrine”).
190 Id. (“[T]he public trust doctrine applies to all water resources without exception or
distinction.”).
191 John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45 ENVTL. L.
463, 478, 481 (2015).
192 Id. at 481-82 (describing how the challenged state statute interfered with “local regulation
of oil and gas operations” under various state environmental and land use laws).
187
188
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zoning ordinances.193 Surprising everyone involved, the court concluded
that the statute conflicted with the state’s obligation under the
Environmental Rights Amendment to protect present and future
generations’ interests in public natural resources.194 Notably, the court
invoked the doctrine sua sponte to resolve the case, even though the
parties had not even raised it in their arguments.195 The move has drawn
renewed attention to the possibilities for intersections between the public
trust and other forms of state action that threaten public natural
resources.196
A few years later, a majority of the same court confirmed that
Pennsylvania is obligated to manage its state parks and forests, including
the oil and minerals therein, as a trustee in accordance with the public
trust principles of the Environmental Rights Amendment.197 The court
reasoned that the clear language expressly affirms both the right of the
people to enjoy these public natural resources and the Commonwealth’s
obligation to maintain them.198
Constitutionalized versions of the doctrine thus provide additional
means of protecting public trust resources and expanded recognition for
new public trust values beyond those traditionally protected at common
law. Even so, scholars like Professor Alexandra Klass have sounded
concerns that statutory public trust principles may inadvertently displace
more flexible common law versions of the doctrine, undermining the
further development of public trust principles to respond to emerging
problems through traditional common law processes.199 An inadvertent
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 981–82 (Pa. 2013).
Id. (“In our view, the framers and ratifiers of the Environmental Rights Amendment
intended the constitutional provision as a bulwark against enactments, like Act 13, which permit
development with such an immediate, disruptive effect upon how Pennsylvanians live their lives.
To comply with the constitutional command, the General Assembly must exercise its police powers
to foster sustainable development in a manner that respects the reserved rights of the people to a
clean, healthy, and esthetically-pleasing environment.”); see also id. at 919-20 (noting, in its
standing analysis, that “a political subdivision has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in
protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders” and that “[t]he protection of
environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life and a
key part of local government’s role”).
195 See, e.g., Dernbach, supra note 191.
196 Id.
197 Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 161 A.3d 911 (Pa. 2017).
198 Id. at 916.
199 Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State Environmental Rights
Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENVTL. L. 431 (2015) (exploring how environmental rights statutes can
effectively displace the common law public trust doctrine and limit its evolution as a tool for
environmental protection); see also Alexandra B. Klass, Modern Public Trust Principles:
Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 726, 744-45 (2006)
(discussing the limitations of both common law and statutory approaches to public trust
governance, and proposing an integrated approach).
193
194
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result could be the calcification of the public trust, effectively freezing it
in time by stifling the organic process of common law development that
has thus far enabled the doctrine to evolve with the changing needs of the
community.200 Indeed, some states, such as Idaho, have committed the
public trust doctrine to statute specifically to prevent the further
development of the doctrine through the judicial common law process.201
C. The Public Trust and Federal Law
American case law has generally presumed that the public trust
doctrine is a feature of purely state law—a view that has been affirmed
directly by the D.C. Circuit in dismissing an attempt to hold the federal
government accountable under the doctrine,202 and one that has been
supported indirectly in dicta by the U.S. Supreme Court on an unrelated
matter.203 While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
question of whether the doctrine applies to federal authority, it declined
a petition for certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of that
position.204 Nevertheless, points of intersection between the public trust
doctrine and important areas of federal law have become evident,
especially its role as a background principle of law in constitutional
takings analysis, and in ongoing debate over the extent to which it should
operate as a constitutive constraint on federal sovereign authority.

200 Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State Environmental Rights
Laws: A Case Study, 45 Envtl. L. 431, 457-59 (2015).
201 IDAHO CODE § 58-1201-1203 (1996) (Chapter 12. Public Trust Doctrine). For a fuller
discussion of the Idaho example, see infra Part IV(C)(2); see also Erin Ryan, From Mono Lake to
the Atmospheric Trust: Navigating the Public and Private Interests in Public Trust Resource
Commons, 10 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 39, 56-57 (2019) (“After the Idaho Supreme
Court issued a series of public trust decisions converging on the California Supreme Court’s
interpretation in Mono Lake, the state legislature enacted a statute that expressly foreclosed this
interpretive path. The legislation declared that the public trust doctrine did limit the state’s ability
to alienate title to the beds of navigable waters, but that it had little impact beyond that, preventing
the doctrine from impacting the allocation of prior appropriative water rights or state decisions
about the commercial, agricultural, or recreational uses of public trust waterways.”); James M.
Kearney, Closing the Floodgates? Idaho’s Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34
IDAHO L. REV. 91, 94 (1997); Blumm et al., supra note 106 at 472 (noting that the new statute “was
the legislature’s response to judicial public trust declarations” in a series of Idaho Supreme Court
cases).
202 Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App’x 7, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But see Michael
Blumm & Lynn S. Schaffer, The Federal Public Trust Doctrine: Misinterpreting Justice Kennedy
and Illinois Central Railroad, 45 ENVTL. L. 399, 400–01 (2015) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit is
incorrect on this point).
203 PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012) (“[T]he public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law.”).
204 Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135 S. Ct. 774 (2014) (denying certiorari to address whether there is a
federal public trust doctrine).
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1. The Doctrine as a Background Principle in Takings Claims.
The public trust doctrine is increasingly invoked in litigation brought
under the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause,205 where it operates as a
legal principle relevant to the parties’ reasonable expectations with regard
to the use of trust resources. While it would take a century to become
clear, the Pollard v. Hagan, Shively v. Bowlby, and Illinois Central
decisions discussed above have effectively enshrined the public trust
doctrine among what contemporary takings jurisprudence refers to as the
“background principles” of state common law, or those built-in legal
norms that constrain owners’ legitimate expectations about the suitable
uses of different kinds of property.206 This intersection between the public
trust doctrine and federal constitutional law drew increasing recognition
after the 1990s, when the Rehnquist Court issued a series of decisions
that strengthened takings claims against regulations limiting property
development.207
Just as the Internet went public and satellite phones were introduced,208
the Supreme Court clarified in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
that takings liability applies whenever state regulation obstructs all
economically viable use of private property, no matter what public
interests are at stake.209 It was an important moment in the evolution of
the Court’s takings jurisprudence, because it removed these conflicts
from the standard regulatory takings balancing test by which courts
normally assess the economic harm to the regulated owner against the
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Erin Ryan, Palazzolo, The Public Trust, and the Property Owner’s Reasonable
Expectations: Takings and the South Carolina Marsh Island Bridge Debate, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J.
121, 123 (analyzing how the public trust doctrine operates as a background principle of law that
can constrain the reasonable expectations of a property owner alleging a taking); id. at 137–40
(2006) (discussing use of the public trust doctrine to defend takings claims by defusing the
reasonableness of claimants’ expectations); see also John D. Echeverria, The Public Trust Doctrine
as a Background Principles Defense in Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 931, 931–34
(2012) (analyzing use of the doctrine as a takings defense in light of two California cases that did
not allow it); J. Peter Byrne, The Public Trust Doctrine, Legislation, and Green Property: A Future
Convergence?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 915, 916 (2012) (suggesting that the doctrine be used as a
defense to innovative regulatory takings claims and to “sustain environmental legislation against
judicial hostility”). But see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1532–
33 (1990) (criticizing use of the doctrine to avoid just compensation for what otherwise looks like
a taking).
207 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism
Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 459-60 (2002) (noting that the Rehnquist Court “toughened
judicial scrutiny of governmental action under the Takings Clause”).
208 Internet, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/technology/Internet
(last visited Sept. 24, 2019); Mobile Telephone, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/technology/mobile-telephone (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
209 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-30 (1992); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 626-30
(2001).
205
206
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public harm the regulation is designed to prevent.210 By sidestepping the
balancing test, the per se rule in Lucas cleared an easier path for plaintiff
owners to challenge environmental regulations limiting the development
of fragile coastal or wetland property. However, the new Lucas rule
contained an important exception: the per se rule would not apply if the
challenged regulation is already among the “background principles” of
state property law—such as the common law of nuisance— that limit the
owner’s reasonable expectations from the start about what they should be
able to do with their property.211
The Supreme Court’s nineteenth century recognition that the public
trust doctrine is a foundational element of state law thus took on new
importance as its twentieth century takings jurisprudence expanded
liability for environmental regulations that interfere with economic use.212
Today, the doctrine is increasingly invoked by state and municipal parties
defending takings claims against regulations involving construction on
tidelands and wetlands, public access to waterways, and interference with
water rights.213 For example, the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected a takings
challenge against the state’s denial of water use permits because “the
original limitation of the public trust” extinguished any claim the
plaintiffs could make to an absolute right to water for purposes other than
those protected by the trust.214 Quoting Professor Joseph Sax, one of the
original scholarly proponents of the modern public trust doctrine,215 the
court explained that “[t]he state is not ‘taking’ something belonging to an
owner, but is asserting a right it always held as a servitude burdening
owners of water rights.”216
Resort to the background principles argument as a shield against
takings challenges has expanded across the United States. Many courts
have affirmed the doctrine as a defense to takings claims in these
circumstances, including decisions in New Jersey,217 Hawaii,218

210 Compare Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, with Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978) (describing the three factor regulatory takings balancing test).
211 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-30; see also Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30.
212 See, e.g., Echeverria, supra note 206; Frank, supra note 137, at 682-84.
213 See Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 45-46.
214 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 494-95 (Haw. 2000).
215 See Sax, supra note 4; see also Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 602 (discussing
the impact of Professor Sax’s article on early public trust litigation).
216 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 497 (quoting Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution,
Property Rights and the Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 280 (1990)).
217 Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. N.J. Dep’t Envl. Prot., 64 F. Supp. 2d 354 (D.N.J. 1999)
(rejecting a takings challenge to a state agency rule requiring developers of waterfront property to
provide walkways along the water, because the public trust doctrine prevents owners from claiming
any entitlement to exclude).
218 In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000).
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Wisconsin,219 South Carolina,220 Louisiana,221 Rhode Island,222 and the
Ninth Circuit.223 Given the extensive history reported in this article and
recited in these decisions, it seems difficult to argue that the public trust
doctrine is not a background principle of state law that should impact
reasonable expectations, even if it remains possible to argue over how,
exactly, it should impact them. Even so, the issue is not fully settled; the
Federal Court of Claims has twice cast doubt on the background
principles defense,224 and Texas Supreme Court has also greeted it with
skepticism.225
219 See R.W. Docks & Slips v. State, 628 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 2001) (rejecting a taking challenge
to the state’s denial of a marina’s dredging permit because the developer lacked reasonable
investment-backed expectations to fill wetlands and because riparian rights are inferior to the public
trust doctrine). The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized, “The public trust doctrine as an
encumbrance on riparian rights is established ‘by judicial authority so long acquiesced in as to
become a rule of property.’ It is part of the organic law of the state, and is to be broadly and
beneficially construed.” Id. at 788 (quoting the 1903 case of Franzini v. Layland, 120 Wis. 72, 81
(1903)).
220 McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 580 S.E.2d 116 (S.C. 2003) (holding that the public trust
doctrine properly blocked tidelands development without compensation, even when the lands at
issue became submerged after the owner took title).
221 See Avenal v. State, 886 So. 2d 1085, 1088, 1102 (La. 2004) (in rejecting a takings challenge
against erosion controlling freshwater diversion programs, holding that “the redistribution of
existing productive oyster beds to other areas must be tolerated under the public trust doctrine”).
222 See Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974, at *1 n.2, *7, *15 (R.I. Super.
Ct. July 5, 2005) (in an unpublished decision on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, rejecting a
takings challenge against the denial of permit to develop in coastal wetlands because, inter alia, the
public trust doctrine prevented the formation of reasonable investment-backed expectations to “fill
or develop that portion of the site which is below mean high water”).
223 Esplanade Prop., LLC v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the city’s
refusal to allow construction of residences on an elevated platform above tidelands, because the
public trust doctrine vitiated any entitlement by the owner to build there).
224 Compare Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276, 1293-96 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (Judge Moore, reversing dismissal of a takings claim by a California irrigator required to
create fish passage lanes to satisfy the Endangered Species Act, and rejecting, in dicta, all
counterarguments that would have barred the claim), with id. at 1297 (Judge Mayer, writing in
dissent: “Casitas does not own the water in question because all water sources within California
belong to the public. Cal. Wat. Code §§ 102, 1001. Whether Casitas even has a vested property
interest in the use of the water is a threshold issue to be determined under California law. California
subjects appropriative water rights licenses to the public trust and reasonable use doctrines, so
Casitas likely has no property interest in the water, and therefore no takings claim.”). Although the
court allowed the Casitas Water District to litigate its takings claim in the 2008 decision, a different
panel on the same court ultimately dismissed the claim (without prejudice) when litigation
concluded in 2013, though without addressing the public trust background principle issue. Casitas
Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2013). See also Tulare Lake
Basin Water Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (in an opinion by the same judge who
authored the 2008 Casitas decision, rejecting the state’s public trust “background principles”
defense against a takings claim by California irrigators after water delivery under a state contract
was temporarily suspended while the state complied with restrictions under the Endangered Species
Act).
225 See Severance v. Patterson, 370 S.W.3d 705, 723 (Tex. 2012) (“[W]hile losing property to
the public trust as it becomes part of the wet beach or submerged under the ocean is an ordinary
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2. The Secret Supreme Court Public Trust Debate.
Although the Supreme Court has not weighed in directly on the public
trust background principles debate, the issue was the subject of a
notorious internal dispute in an important takings case from the Rehnquist
Court era involving coastal lands and municipal exactions. In Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, the majority concluded that the state was
not entitled to require a private owner to allow public beach access by a
trail easement along the edge of private waterfront land in exchange for
permission to exceed existing land use regulations on building height.226
Justice Brennan authored a lengthy dissent in which he briefly invoked
the public trust doctrine in defense of the state’s attempt to preserve
public access to coastal waters: “The Court’s insistence on a precise fit
between the forms of burden and condition on each individual parcel
along the California coast would penalize the Commission for its
flexibility, hampering the ability to fulfill its public trust mandate.”227 For
many years, however, the public was unaware of how substantially this
published dissent departed from Justice Brennan’s initial draft.
Justice Brennan had initially circulated a proposed dissent that began
with a ten-page exposition of the public trust doctrine and its modern
importance, citing it as the foundation for California’s coastal regulatory
policy and an independent basis for rejecting any takings claim premised
on the plaintiff’s claimed right to exclude the public from the beach.228 In
reviewing the original draft (among the Papers of Justices Harry
Blackmun and Thurgood Marshall that are on file at the Library of
Congress), Professor Richard Lazarus reports that the dissent began by
tracing the doctrine from the California constitution back to Roman law
and ended with the conclusion that this historical understanding of public
and private property rights in waterways forms the basis for intensive
state regulation of coastal areas.229 According to Lazarus, Brennan’s
initial dissent argued that the public trust doctrine “independently
hazard of ownership for coastal property owners, it is far less reasonable, and unsupported by
ancient common law precepts, to hold that a public easement can suddenly encumber an entirely
new portion of a landowner’s property or a different landowner’s property that was not previously
subject to that right of use.”).
226 483 U.S. 825, 828, 837, 841-42 (1987).
227 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847 (1987).
228 Richard J. Lazarus, Judicial Missteps, Legislative Disfunction, and the Public Trust
Doctrine: Can Two Wrongs Make It Right?, 45 ENVTL. L. 1139, 1146-47 (2015) (citing
Memorandum from Judicial Clerk, Supreme Court of the United States, to Harry A. Blackmun,
Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States 1 (June 9, 1987) (on file with the Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Papers of Harry A. Blackmun)).
229 Richard J. Lazarus, November 8, 2019 email communication to the Environmental Law
Professors Listserv, on file with author (telling the full story); July 7, 2019 email communication
to author (affirming permission for publication of this story).
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defeated any possible takings claim based on a private property right to
exclude the public from the beach in front of the landowner’s home.”230
In Professor Lazarus’s account of the judicial exchange behind closed
doors, Justice Brennan’s proposed dissent resulted in “a firestorm of
controversy within and between chambers,” prompting a series of
negotiations between the Justices.231 Justice Blackmun vehemently
opposed Brennan’s invocation of the public trust in support of a position
being rejected by the majority, fearing that it would prompt a punishing
response in Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion that could
undermine the potential force of the doctrine in future jurisprudence.232
He worried that even if the majority did not directly repudiate the
doctrine, the central role that the doctrine would play in Justice Brennan’s
dissent would indirectly suggest that the Court had rejected it.233 The two
justices and their clerks then engaged in a back-and-forth exchange of
draft opinions in which Blackmun sought to persuade Brennan to
eliminate his reliance on the public trust doctrine by threatening to
specifically repudiate this analysis in a separate dissent that he would
author himself.234
Lazarus, supra note 228 at 1146.
See sources cited supra notes 228-229.
232 Lazarus, supra note 228, at 1146 (“Justice Blackmun’s chambers objected to Justice
Brennan’s inclusion of that discussion—not because of any substantive disagreement, but instead
on purely tactical grounds.”).
233 Id. at 1146-47 (“Justice Blackmun’s clerk believed that any such discussion in Justice
Brennan’s dissent was ill-advised because it increased the odds that Justice Scalia might add
language to the majority opinion expressly rejecting the doctrine or, even absent such a direct
majority response, his opinion for the Court might more likely be read by the lower courts as
implicitly doing so.”).
234 See sources cited supra notes 228-229. Richard Lazarus offered even more detail about the
exchange in an account to the Environmental Law Professor’s Listserv. This account includes so
much more delightful intrigue than he reports in the published article that, with his permission, I
thought it worth including here:
“On June 9, Justice Blackmun’s clerk for the case advised her Justice about what Brennan had
done, with ominous words, and suggested he decline to join the dissent. Her concern was that ‘By
featuring it so exhaustively in the dissent, Justice Brennan in effect incorporates the public trust
doctrine into the position rejected by the majority. I regard this as unnecessary and unfortunate.’
The clerk accordingly recommended that Blackmun ask Brenna [sic] ‘to eliminate the first portion
of this opinion and then to join the rest.’ The clerk further warned that she was not sure this would
work – ‘I do not know if there is any hope of getting him to do this’ but because ‘The Brennan clerk
who worked on this case is known for launching grand strategies to order to get votes,’ and ‘they
might be willing to modify the opinion in order to get your joinder.’
“On June 12, Blackmun circulated his own first draft of a dissent just for himself saying not just
[] what his final published dissent later said – ‘I do not understand the Court’s opinion in this case
to implicate in any way the public-trust doctrine’ – but also a broadside complaint to Brennan for
his then draft dissent: ‘I thus find Justice Brennan’s reliance on this ground somewhat unusual, and
I base my dissent on reasons independent of the public trust doctrine.’
“Blackmun’s ploy apparently worked. On June 15, Blackmun’s clerk wrote her Justice that
Brennan did now ‘remove the major section with the exposition of the public trust doctrine.’ She
230
231
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In the end, Justice Brennan’s published dissent featured only the single
reference to the doctrine, which signaled the importance of state
obligations to protect public interests in coastal waters but in an
understated way that did not prompt a response.235 Justice Blackmun’s bid
to minimize the public trust discussion from Brennan’s dissent succeeded
in keeping the majority from repudiating the doctrine entirely, but Justice
Scalia’s majority decision troubled Blackmun enough that he nonetheless
penned a separate dissent.236 And within it, out of “an apparent abundance
of caution,” 237 he took pains to stress that he did “not understand the
Court’s opinion in this case to implicate in any way the public-trust
doctrine.”238
3. A Constitutive Constraint on Federal Authority?
Yet even beyond the specific issue of constitutional takings, some
scholars have long argued that the doctrine is better understood not as an
inherent limit on only state sovereign authority,239 but as a quasiconstitutional “constitutive” limit on sovereign authority in general,
including federal authority.240 A constititutive limit is one that is built into
further explained in her memo that their ‘major goal is to prevent Justice Scalia from adding
something to the majority that repudiates the public trust doctrine’ and to that end, she
recommended that Blackmun now withdraw his separate dissent and join Brennan’s.
“On June 24, just before the final decision was published, the clerk wrote to Blackmun to say
that the ‘case has gone from bad to worse’ in light of more changes made by Scalia and there was
no need to withdraw his (Blackmun’s) separate dissent and still chiding Brennan’s chambers,
though happily the lengthy public trust discussion was now out of Brennan’s dissent: ‘The damage
has been done by Justice Brennan’s dissent, not by your separate statement’ though Blackmun
should now take the last sentence of his draft out, to delete the reference to Brennan’s extended
public trust discussion, which was no longer there.” Lazarus email of Nov. 8, 2019, supra note 229.
235 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 847 (1987); see also text accompanying note 227, supra.
236 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (J. Blackmun, dissenting).
237 Lazarus, supra note 228, at 1147.
238 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (J. Blackmun, dissenting).
239 See, e.g., Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust and In-Stream Uses, 19 ENVTL. L. 605, 609 (1989)
(arguing that the public trust is an inalienable attribute of state sovereignty).
240 See, e.g., Joseph Regalia, A New Water Law Vista: Rooting the Public Trust Doctrine in the
Courts, 108 KY. L.J. 1, 6 (2020) (“Not only should litigants be able to argue for an expansion of
trust duties in state courts under state constitutions, they should also be able to argue for this
expansion in federal courts under the U.S. Constitution.”); Michael Blumm & Mary Christina
Wood, “No Ordinary Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process, and The Public Trust Doctrine, 67
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2017) (arguing that the public trust doctrine is “an inherent constitutional
limit on sovereignty”); Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 202 (arguing that the public trust doctrine is
an inherent limit on both state and federal sovereign authority, and that Illinois Central represents
an application of the Tenth Amendment’s reserved powers doctrine); Gerald Torres & Nathan
Bellinger, The Public Trust: The Law’s DNA, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 281, 288 (2014)
(arguing that the public trust doctrine is an implied limit on federal authority because “is the
chalkboard on which the Constitution is written”); Chase, supra note146, at 133, 137-42 (2010)
(arguing that the Illinois Central public trust doctrine is grounded in federal common law, and that
the federal common law reading confers continuing legitimacy on the decision, even after the 1938
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the fabric of sovereign authority, such that it cannot be extinguished
through normal judicial or legislative process, as are ordinary exercises
of sovereign power. State Supreme Courts in California and Hawaii,
among others, have already made this determination with regard to the
role of the doctrine in state law.241 Pursuing the same intuition, scholars
and advocates increasingly suggest that relevant federal sovereign
authority should also be subject to public trust limits.242 As Professor
Gerald Torres and Nathan Bellinger have written,
While some rights are created by government, others—often the
most important pre-existing rights—are inherent to humankind
and merely secured by government. The public trust doctrine is
one of these inherent rights that pre-dates the United States
Constitution. As such, we suggest that the public trust doctrine is
the chalkboard on which the Constitution is written. When one
writes something on a chalkboard, we see the meaning of the
writing, but we commonly forget that there is still a chalkboard
that created the space for the writing. We recognize that meaning
comes from what is actually written, but there could be no such
conveyance of meaning without the chalkboard as a foundation.
After all, the Constitution was not written on a blank slate but was
written with certain principles and rights in mind. As the
chalkboard on which the Constitution was written, the public trust

Erie Railroad decision limited the reach of federal common law); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional
Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425, 453, 458, 461-62 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s Illinois
Central decision was “premised on federal law” and that the public trust doctrine is therefore a
feature of both federal and state law, because states manage trust lands within a federally imposed
limit that prevents them from abdicating their responsibility as trustees). But see Charles F.
Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Lands Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269, 273-74,
278 (1980) (arguing for a public trust responsibility in the federal administration of federal public
lands, but that this trust responsibility arises from a different source from the state-constraining
public trust in submerged lands).
241 See supra notes 188-189 and accompanying text.
242 See, e.g., MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW
ECOLOGICAL AGE 133–36 (2014) [hereinafter NATURE’S TRUST]; Mary Christina Wood,
Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and
Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L.
43, 74 (2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part I]; Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): Instilling
a Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 135–36 (2009) [hereinafter Wood, Part
II] (suggesting avenues for Congress to meet its public trust responsibilities); Blumm & Schaffer,
supra note 202, at 401 (arguing that “there is considerable precedent applying the public trust
doctrine to the federal government”); Blumm et al., supra note 106, at 494 (“[T]he public trust is
grounded in the federal constitutional equal footing doctrine.”); Epstein, supra note 163, at 426
(asserting that the constitutional nature of the trust limits sovereign authority over public property
in the same way the takings clause limits sovereign authority over private property).
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doctrine provides the background and context for the
Constitution.243

New litigation following this line of argument assert that as an inherent
limit on sovereign authority, the public trust doctrine may also be an
implied feature of federal constitutional law.244 If so, then it may have
application to waters under federal jurisdiction, and possibly to other
natural resources that can be protected only by federal authority, such as
the atmospheric commons under assault by greenhouse gas pollution.245
The argument proceeds along both logical and historical lines. The
logical argument is that there no principled reason to differentiate
between the state or federal nature of the sovereign power rightfully
constrained by the doctrine when the sovereign acts in a manner contrary
to the public interest in trust resources.246 Received as part of the English
common law that forms the bedrock of all American legal institutions,
the doctrine is neither a creature of state nor federal law, but a constraint
on the sovereign authority delegated to each level of government within
our federal system.247 Whatever sovereign possesses legal authority over
critical natural resource commons must match it with responsibility for
protecting the public interests in them that have been recognized since
ancient Rome.
The historical argument asserts that the public trust doctrine must
constrain federal as well as state authority, because there are neither
logical nor historical grounds to differentiate their implicit origins.
Except for the very first states, the trust obligations of most American
states arose by delegation of federal authority over lands previously held
in federal ownership. Today, the doctrine most often constrains state
authority, because under the equal footing doctrine of the U.S.
Constitution,248 states own the submerged lands beneath navigable

Torres & Bellinger, supra note 240, at 288.
See, e.g., Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 202, at 403-06; see also Ryan, supra note 1, From
Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, at 60-64 (discussing the argument as raised in atmospheric
trust litigation, including Juliana v. United States); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224
(D. Or. 2016), rev’d, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
245 See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 235, at 136 (arguing that federal trust obligations
should apply to protect the atmosphere against private appropriation as a disposal site for
greenhouse gas pollution).
246 Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 202, at 401 (“The public trust doctrine, properly understood,
is an inherent limit on all sovereigns—not merely state sovereigns.”); WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST,
supra note 242, at 133–36.
247 See WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 242, at 133–36.
248 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1; Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566 (1911) (interpreting the
equal footing clause); see also Blumm et al., supra note 106 at 490 (1997) (discussing the
relationship between the equal footing doctrine and the public trust doctrine); Dunning, supra note
105, at 524 (same).
243
244
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waterways;249 and under the Submerged Lands Act,250 they are the
primary regulators of tidelands within three miles of shore.251 But other
than the original thirteen colonies, all states inherited their trust
obligations through the medium of federal sovereignty that applied before
their lands were carved out of federal holdings.252 The states must have
inherited a pre-existing trust obligation, goes this reasoning, because
there is no clear legal moment when new trust obligations were expressly
conferred. Therefore, the doctrine must have implicitly inhered at the
federal level before it was delegated to the states, and by this theory, it
remains there in application to all trust resources that were not delegated
to the states.253
Advocates thus maintain that, by the logic underlying the doctrine and
the history over which it came into effect, there is no persuasive reason
to distinguish between state or federal sovereignty when they govern
resources that are appropriately subject to the public trust.254 The trust
simply establishes a constraint on sovereign authority at whatever is the
relevant level to protect public trust resources from private expropriation
or monopolization. For submerged lands that remain under federal
jurisdiction, or for other obligations the doctrine may be held to create,
these scholars and litigants argue that the federal government should be
equally bound as trustee.255
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not squarely considered the issue,
leaving open to question the ultimate role of the doctrine as a limit on
federal authority. To be sure, such a finding would have to overcome
formidable hurdles in other Supreme Court dicta suggesting that there is
no cognizable federal public trust.256 In PPL Montana v. Montana, the
Court considered a separate doctrine involving the role of navigable
waterways in establishing state title, but the majority opinion noted that
249 See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222, 230 (1845) (affirming under the equal
footing doctrine that the state of Alabama owned the submerged land beneath its navigable
waterways); see also Chase, supra note 146, at 121-22 (discussing the equal footing doctrine, as
set forth in Pollard’s Lessee, as an analytical building block of the public trust doctrine).
250 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315 (2012).
251 43 U.S.C. §§ 1311–1312 (2012) (discussing state authority over submerged lands and
seaward boundaries).
252 One way of viewing this is that in the equal footing conveyances, the federal government
itself imposed the trust on the states. See Blumm & Schaffer, supra note 202, at 403-06 (discussing
Justice Kennedy’s reference to the equal footing doctrine in Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261 (1997) and what it means for the public trust doctrine’s origins).
253 See Blumm & Shaffer, supra note 202.
254 Id.; WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST, supra note 242, at 133–36.
255 See Blumm & Shaffer, supra note 202.
256 PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012); cf. Alec L. v. McCarthy, 135
S. Ct. 774 (2014) (denying a petition for certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia).
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the public trust doctrine is a matter of state law.257 That brief reference,
suggesting that the doctrine is not an implied feature of federal
constitutional law, weakens the argument that the public trust doctrine
binds federal authority in the same way that it binds the states—but the
reference appears as dicta, presenting a conclusion that was not properly
presented or argued before the court. It remains to be seen whether this
dicta will hold firm over time or be dislodged by more directed Supreme
Court litigation in the future.
The issue was most recently raised, together with other novel claims,
in Juliana v. United States,258 the “Kid’s Climate Case,” in which youth
plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for state and federal regulatory failures
to protect the air commons from private appropriation by greenhouse gas
polluters.259 The federal district court judge in Oregon initially agreed that
the claim deserved its day in court, upholding the case against multiple
motions to dismiss and two writs of mandamus by the Trump
Administration.260 Similarly, the Supreme Court dismissed two petitions
by the Administration for certiorari, but in the second one, lightly
weighed in on the substantive issue by obliquely suggesting that the Ninth
Circuit consider the writ of mandamus on interlocutory appeal.261 The
district court judge heard the unspoken implications of the Supreme
Court’s order and reversed herself, certifying the plaintiff’s writ of

257 PPL Mont., LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1235 (“Unlike the equal-footing doctrine, however, which is
the constitutional foundation for the navigability rule of riverbed title, the public trust doctrine
remains a matter of state law.”).
258 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020).
259 Id.; see also Ryan, et al., Debating the Fundamentals of the Fundamental Right, supra note
1 (analyzing both the atmospheric trust claim and the accompanying fundamental rights claim for
climate stability); Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 60-64
(discussing the atmospheric trust litigation and analyzing the substantive and procedural history of
Juliana v. United States).
260 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1164-66. For Judge Aiken’s dramatic ruling on the initial motion to
dismiss, see Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
261 In re Juliana v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 586 U.S. __ (No. 18A410, Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/18A410-In-Re-United-StatesOrder.pdf. The Court’s order suggested that it was denying the petition because relief might still be
available from the Ninth Circuit, and it implied that the Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the
government’s efforts to dismiss the case for reasons that may no longer be valid: “At this time . . .
the Government’s petition for a writ of mandamus does not have a ‘fair prospect’ of success in this
Court because adequate relief may be available in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit . . . . Although the Ninth Circuit has twice denied the Government’s request for mandamus
relief, it did so without prejudice. And the court’s basis for denying relief rested, in large part, on
the early stage of the litigation, the likelihood that plaintiffs’ claims would narrow as the case
progressed, and the possibility of attaining relief through ordinary dispositive motions. Those
reasons are, to a large extent, no longer pertinent. The 50-day trial was scheduled to begin on
October 29, 2018, and is being held in abeyance only because of the current administrative stay.”
Id.
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mandamus to the Ninth Circuit on interlocutory appeal.262 After an
extended period of consideration, the Ninth Circuit finally reversed the
trial court and dismissed the case,263 over a vigorous dissent.264 As this
piece goes to press, the plaintiffs are considering further appeals, but the
procedural history of the case to date suggests that the Supreme Court is
not eager to entertain the issue. However, the extraordinary volley of the
federal public trust claim back and forth among the different levels of
federal jurisdiction testifies to the gravity of the issue, and the likelihood
that the Court will eventually have to consider it.
IV. CONFLICTS WITH AMERICAN WATER LAW
So far, this Article has introduced the public trust doctrine as a public
commons-based theory of rights and responsibilities with regard to
natural resource commons, especially waterways.265 However, there is a
countervailing body of law that we must also contend with to understand
the regulation of waterways in the United States, and it follows a wholly
different theoretical model. This is the law of private water allocation,
known more simply in the United States as “water law,” and it tells us
who gets to use the water within these watercourses and for what
purposes.
Water law regulates the private benefits that individuals and others can
receive from public water commons. Deciding how much water can be
withdrawn from a waterway is just as important to the maintenance of
public environmental values as the public trust doctrine (and in many
cases, arguably more so), but historically, water law has been more
focused on promoting economic development through the allocation and
protection of private rights in water resources. Water laws grant discrete
rights for the use or extraction of freshwater, including both surface and
groundwater sources. This enables families, farms, and businesses to
claim water for household, agricultural, and industrial purposes. Water
laws also enable cities, towns, and irrigation districts to claim water that
they then make available to residents and commercial entities for the
same uses through distribution networks within their jurisdictions.

262 Certification of Interlocutory Appeal, Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-cv-01517-AA, 2018
WL 6303774, at *3 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2018).
263 Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1175.
264 Id.
265 For analysis of other public commons arguably subject to the public trust, see MICHAEL C.
BLUMM & MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2013), discussing wildlife (id. at 195-232), parks and public lands (id.
at 233-256), atmospheric resources (id. at 349-64); ocean resources (id. at 365-67), electromagnetic
spectrum (id. at 386-91), cultural property (id. at 392-96), and others.
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Like the public trust doctrine, there is much regional variation in
American water law. Water allocation is a feature of state law, and though
there are many differences between the states, there are two main models
for allocating water rights: (1) the riparian rights approach followed in
most eastern states, under which all users must share, and (2) the prior
appropriations approach preferred in most western states, in which the
first to claim water has a superior right to later comers.266 In a smaller
“hybrid” category, a few states incorporate elements of both systems.267
The eastern approach establishes correlative rights in a common pool
framework, but the western approach comes closer to a privatization
model, allowing users to claim an entitlement to water from which they
can exclude later-comers, no matter how compelling their need.268
The looming problem should be obvious by now, especially in the
Western United States: while the public trust doctrine follows a public
commons model, the prior appropriations doctrine follows a privatization
model—and yet the water governed under both laws is the very same
water. The water to which individuals and other entities can obtain
private rights of use under water allocation doctrines is the exact same
water that makes up the waterways protected by the public trust doctrine.
If all available water in the watercourse is allocated to private
appropriators, then there will no longer be a watercourse for protection
under the public trust doctrine. Indeed, the two bodies of law—the public
trust doctrine and the law of private water allocation—are doctrinally
orthogonal, with no intentional points of overlap. In one of the more
serious follies of American legal evolution, each developed
independently of the other, as though they have no substantive
relationship at all.269
This Part introduces these two approaches to water allocation, touching
on the eastern riparian rights approach before focusing on the western
approach of prior appropriations that is poised for more serious conflict
with the public trust doctrine. It shows why these two bodies of laws were
inevitably destined to collide, as they have done so famously in epic
western water battles like the Mono Lake and Scott River cases in
California, the legislative-judicial showdown in Idaho, and the Walker
Lake Basin dispute in Nevada.
266 See Christine Klein, Mary Jane Angelo & Richard Hamann, Modernizing Water Law: The
Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. REV. 403, 406-07 (2009) (contrasting eastern and western water
law).
267 California, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington have hybrid system. STEPHEN HODGSON, DEV. L. SERV., FAO LEGAL
OFF., FAO LEGIS. STUDY 92: MODERN WATER RIGHTS THEORY AND PRACTICE 13 and n.2 (2006).
268 Klein et al, supra note 266, at 406-09.
269 See Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 47.
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A. Eastern Riparian Rights
Eastern states generally follow the riparian rights doctrine inherited
from British common law, which historically assigned interdependent
rights for reasonable use of water resources among all the landowners
along a watercourse.270 In riparianism, the “reasonableness” of use is
contextual, determined by the total set of individual demands on the
available resource.271
The riparian rights approach treats the waterway as a common pool
resource in which authorized users hold correlative rights, because the
scope of every right to withdraw is dependent on the scope of all others.
As a rule, everybody has to share.272 At common law, authorization to use
the waterway was based on the possession of riparian land bounding the
watercourse. Today, many riparian jurisdictions have modernized the
doctrine to de-privilege riparian ownership, allowing water to be exported
from the riparian tract and treating all users under the same rubric for
assigning claims.273 Yet under both the modern and traditional approach,
all rights of use are coupled with a duty not to unreasonably harm other
rights-holders by overdrawing or otherwise compromising the resource.
By establishing correlative rights in a shared resource with liability to
other users for unreasonable harm, riparianism incorporates elements of
tort law within a framework bearing resemblance to the public commons
model that animates the public trust.274 These laws treat the water subject
to allocation as a public commons or a common pool, establishing
interdependent rights wherein every user’s rights are limited by the
legitimate needs of all other users.275 For example, in 1888, as Susan B.
Anthony was organizing for women’s suffrage276 the Connecticut
Supreme Court enjoined one mill owner from impounding a stream to the
detriment of other downstream mill operators in Mason v. Hoyle.277
Emphasizing the reciprocal nature of rights and duties among riparian
claimants, the court articulated the five core principles for “reasonably”

See Klein et al., supra note 266, at 406.
Id. at 407.
272 Id.
273 Id. at 411-12 (discussing the elimination by regulated riparianism of the common law
riparian ownership criteria).
274 Professor Christine Klein has characterized the model as based in tort, because users are
prohibited from inflicting unreasonable harm on one another by their use of the shared water
resource. Id. at 406.
275 Id. at 406-07.
276 International
Council
of
Women,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/International-Council-of-Women (Sept. 24, 2019) (explaining
that in 1888, Susan B. Anthony organized the International Council of Women to fight for suffrage).
277 Mason v. Hoyle, 14 A. 786 (Conn. 1888).
270
271
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allocating water under the common law “reasonable use” doctrine of
riparian rights:
(1) All riparians have an equal opportunity to use the stream;
(2) No owner may use his own property so as to injure another;
(3) Adjudicators should consider the character and capacity of the
stream;
(4) The burden of foreseeable shortages should be allocated fairly
among all riparians; and
(5) Customary practices provide a foundation for evaluating
“reasonableness.” 278
Modern riparianism jurisdictions continue to apply the correlative
spirit of reasonable use riparianism in considering the interests of all
claimants on a waterway before assigning definitive rights to any, and
they increasingly consider the environmental values of healthy stream
ecosystems as well. For example, in 2005, in Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation. v. Nestle Waters North America, the Michigan Court of
Appeals enjoined some—but not all—of the Nestle Corporation’s claims
to withdraw water from a stream that also served boating, swimming,
fishing, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes.279 The case highlights the
responsibility of a riparian rights state to fairly allocate water to preserve
as many different uses of a waterway as possible.
One advantage of the riparian rights system, especially after deprivileging riparian ownership, is that it puts the needs of all claimants on
relatively equal footing—every riparian claim is as important as any
other. Local Michigan residents could challenge lucrative diversions by
the Nestle Corporation, and the concerns of mill owners harmed by
upstream impoundments were not foreclosed if their mills were
established later in time. However, a resulting disadvantage is that the
pure common law system creates enormous uncertainty about the scope
of any user’s rights, because new claims along the waterway will always
require a new analysis of the resulting web of interdependent rights. The
workability of riparian rights hinged on the assumption, generally true in
Britain and the early eastern American states, that there would usually be
enough water to go around.280 As water resources have come under the

Id. at 788-90.
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., 709 N.W. 2d 174, 19495, 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
280 See Klein et al., supra note 266, at 429; T. E. Lauer, The Common Law Background of the
Riparian Doctrine, 28 MO. L. REV. 60, 64 (1963).
278
279
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pressure of increasing population and development in the east, many
states have therefore adopted statutory systems of “regulated
riparianism.” These systems partner elements of the original correlative
rights framework with a permit-based system that preserves the riparian
“reasonableness” inquiry with greater security of right over set periods of
time. 281
Because riparian rights are premised on a theory of waterways as
commons resources, conflicts with the public trust doctrine—which also
presumes that waterways are public commons—have been relatively
modest thus far. Riparianism also includes features that, at least
historically, have been more friendly to environmental and distributive
justice concerns than the western appropriations doctrine.
Conceptualizing water as a resource that everyone must share,
riparianism requires a balancing of equities during water emergencies,282
requiring all users to proportionally “share the shortage” during times of
drought or emergency. Moreover, riparianism has always protected uses
that leave water in the stream (as for fishing, swimming, and boating), on
par with uses that extract water from the stream (as for irrigation or
manufacturing). For this reason, riparian rights have historically afforded
more protection for such environmental concerns as ecological values,
habitat, and the scenic and recreational values associated with instream
flow and intact stream systems.283
Indeed, under the original “natural flow doctrine” of riparian rights that
American states initially inherited from England, rights to withdraw were
limited by the requirement that the stream retain enough water to
approximate its “natural flow.”284 Under “natural flow” riparian rights,
instream uses like fishing, swimming, and boating were favored over
extractive uses, and waterways were necessarily protected from overdraft
in ways that benefited their associated ecological, recreational, and
esthetic values. However, by mandating unimpeded flows in waterways,
the natural flow doctrine substantially inhibited economic development
and was eventually replaced by the modern “reasonable use doctrine” of
riparian rights.285 The reasonable use doctrine limits users from depleting
281 See Klein et al., supra note 266 (discussing Florida’s model of regulatory riparianism); see
generally REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE (AMERICAN SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS
2004).
282 In the traditional common law doctrine, water was shared equally by all riparian landowners.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 cmt. a., illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). In states that
adopt regulated riparianism statutes, most privileges associated with riparian ownership are
eliminated. See Klein et al., supra note 266, at 411–12.
283 See Klein et al., supra note 266, at 410-11.
284 See, e.g., Merrit v. Parker, 1 N.J.L. 460 (1795).
285 See, e.g., Mason v. Hoyle, 56 Conn. 255, 14 A. 86 (1888).
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streamflow only relative to the needs of other users, thus enabling fuller
depletion if extractors’ claims outweigh those for instream use.286
The shift from “natural flow” to “reasonable use” riparianism
represents a rare example from water law in which the original common
law doctrine is more environmentally protective than the modern trend.
It stands in opposition to the historical arc of the public trust doctrine
described in this Article, in which environmental values have received
increasingly more doctrinal protection over time—and it is noteworthy
that the contrast may not be accidental. As water allocation law became
less environmentally protective over time, perhaps more responsibility
for maintaining the health of the waterway was effectively shifted to the
state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine.
In any event, as demands on the water resource intensify even in the
comparatively wet eastern states, riparianism is coming under more and
more of the same environmental pressures as appropriative rights
regimes. Without additional regulation, traditional riparianism could
provoke a tragedy-of-the-commons race to withdraw, with no absolute
requirement to leave flow instream independent of claimed uses. Exactly
such a dilemma is now playing out in the Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint river basin dispute among Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, where
growing withdrawals by Atlanta and other upstream users have so
depleted river flows that it has decimated the oyster fishery at the river
system’s delta in Apalachicola Bay on the northern Gulf Coast.287 As this
piece goes to press, the dispute is entering its third decade of Supreme
Court adjudication.288
For this and other reasons, riparian rights states shifting from the pure
common law system to statutory systems of regulated riparianism
generally add protections for instream uses, environmental values,
distributive justice, and other concerns that are not necessarily addressed
by the common law.289 These protective measures will hopefully forestall
the tragedy of the commons that the traditional doctrine could enable.
However, increasing water scarcity issues in the east suggest that the
potential for conflicts between riparian rights and the public trust doctrine
that have remained dormant until now could materialize at some future
point.290

Id.
Florida v. Georgia, 585 U.S. ___ (2018); 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018).
288 See
Florida
v.
Georgia,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/casefiles/cases/florida-v-georgia-2/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
289 See Klein et al., supra note 266 (discussing Florida’s model of regulatory riparianism).
290 See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018) (remanding to the special master a
dispute between three riparian rights jurisdictions, Florida, Alabama, and Georgia, over Atlanta’s
286
287
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B. Western Prior Appropriations
The doctrine of prior appropriations, adopted in arid western states
where water scarcity is the defining feature, works very differently.
Following the “first-come-first-claimed” rule of resource allocation that
nineteenth century miners brought with them as they pushed westward,
this doctrine establishes first-in-time rights to appropriate water for
exclusive private use.291 Under the traditional common law approach, the
first user to take water out of a watercourse and put it to “beneficial use”
(domestic or economically productive use) creates a perpetual right to
continue taking the same amount for the same use.292 That right of
appropriation can be asserted against any conflicting needs by those who
come later—including the general public.293 There is no formal obligation
to share or proportionally curtail use during times of shortage.
Moreover, instream uses like fishing, navigation, and related
environmental values received no protection at common law, because
appropriative rights could be substantiated only by withdrawal.294 For
example, in the 1882 case of Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch, the first case to
formally apply the new doctrine of appropriative rights, the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed the rights of an irrigator removing water from
the stream over the claims of a downstream riparian farmer who had long
benefited from the stream without specifically diverting it.295 In the same
year that western outlaw Jesse James was brought to justice,296 the
Colorado high court brought justice for the irrigator that had first
removed water from the watercourse, protecting his right to continue
appropriating that water for his own purposes without regard to the needs
of the downstream user who had failed to perfect an appropriative
claim.297
Water rights administration under the traditional prior appropriations
doctrine had the advantage of being relatively simple, especially in
comparison to riparianism. There was no need for a contextual
determination of reasonableness, or to repeatedly account for all the
depletion of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River system to the point of leaving insufficient
water to sustain the fishing industry at the river’s terminus in Florida’s Apalachicola Bay).
291 Klein et al., supra note 266, at 406 (2009) (“[T]he arid western states historically have
followed the prior appropriation doctrine, protecting the right to use water according to temporal
priority of use.”).
292 Id. at 408–09.
293 See id.
294 Id. at 215–18.
295 Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch. Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
296 Jesse
James
and
Frank
James,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Jesse-James-and-Frank-James (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
297 Coffin, 6 Colo. at 447.
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needs that might be asserted along a watercourse. In the world of
appropriative rights, it was understood from the start that there would not
be sufficient water in the stream to satisfy everyone’s needs. First-in-time
rights were adopted and then entrenched to encourage the settlement and
economic development of the arid west, ensuring rewards to those who
had invested in anticipation of continued access to the water resources
they had been first to identify.298 Waterways were still public commons,299
but once use rights were assigned, they operated independently of one
another—at least to the extent that earlier claims would not be diminished
by the demands of later-comers.300
Appropriative rights are not correlative, but assigning them on the
basis of temporal priority nevertheless creates elaborate webs of
interrelated claims along a watercourse. Long-established uses are always
satisfied before newer uses, whether they are upstream, downstream,
more or less geographically or economically sensible, or of lower or
higher social value. But the ordering of different uses from the top to the
bottom of the stream creates multiple points of intersection that tie one
use to another.301 Some uses are purely extractive, while others, such as
irrigation or hydropower generation, return some or all of their flow back
to the watercourse. These “return flows” are then available for junior
claimants downstream from the point of reintroduction (upstream
claimants, even those more senior in time, are obviously out of luck), so
return flows are assiduously calculated, reclaimed, and jealously
guarded.302 An inefficent alfalfa farm in place before an upstream hospital
was built will always be able to satisfy its claim before the hospital can
draw any water, but whatever water returns to the stream after irrigating
the alfalfa will be available to a downstream factory that came later
still . . . and so the web extends.
For this reason, even seemingly exclusive western water rights can be
as interdependent as riparian rights. Rights are interrelated because water
in a stream cycles through multiple uses along its journey through the
watershed, with the sequence of claims depending not only on the
temporal priority of users, but also the nature of their use, how much is
298 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFER IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 70-71 (1992), https://doi.org/10.17226/1803.
299 See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (declaring that all waters in the state belong to the
public).
300 Klein, supra note 266, at 408.
301 See, e.g., Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855) (involving the overlapping nature of
appropriative rights).
302 See Steven E. Clyde, Marketplace Reallocation in the Colorado River Basin: Better
Utilization of the West’s Scarce Water Resources, 28 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 49, 57
(2008) (explaining the importance of the historic right to return flows).
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returned, and their positions along the watercourse. Many prior
appropriation states similarly imposed first-in-time rules for allocating
groundwater—often without appreciating the hydrological relationship
between surface and ground water resources—further intertwining
appropriative claims.303 Making changes within these webs is accordingly
very difficult, because altering the nature, amount, or positioning of any
one use will likely affect the availability of water claimed by other
appropriators on the stream.304 And when their entitlements to continue
diverting water have been challenged, appropriators have defended their
claims vigorously, sometimes with the full force of constitutional
protection for private property.305
In contrast to the riparian rights common-pool approach, then, the prior
appropriation doctrine takes a privatization approach to resource
allocation—the very opposite of the public commons approach implied
by the public trust doctrine.306 Whoever is first to put water to beneficial
use can claim the right to continue doing so, potentially indefinitely, and
excluding all others.307 Not only does the doctrine reward early movers,
granting them a protectable right to exclude those who seek to establish
claims afterward, it rewards those who take full possession of the water—
literally removing it from the waterway, leaving nothing behind for other
uses. As noted, a common law appropriator had to actually withdraw
water from the stream to perfect a claim; appropriative rights were not
available for instream uses like fishing, swimming, wildlife, or aesthetic
purposes. And because any water that remains or returns to the stream
303 See, e.g., Scott River Case, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393 (applying the public trust doctrine to curtail
groundwater withdrawals that were affecting the surface water resources of the Scott River in
California). The law of groundwater withdrawals has historically been treated separately from the
law of surface water withdrawals, having developed awkwardly before science demonstrated that
proximate ground and surface waters are usually hydrologically connected. In some states, water
law has evolved to account for this relationship, while in others, ground and surface water remain
separately allocated. Compare Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E. 2d 324 (Ohio 1984)
(rationalizing groundwater allocation with surface water allocation doctrines under the
Restatement’s Reasonable Use doctrine) with Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., 1 S.W.3d
75 (Texas 1999) (affirming that Texas groundwater is allocated under the rule of capture, even
though surface water is allocated by prior appropriation, and one who captures groundwater may
directly interfere with a prior appropriative right to impacted surface waters).
304 BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND
MATERIALS 224–27 (5th ed. 2013) (discussing the requirements for maintaining a permit).
305 See, e.g., Tulare Lake Basin v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (holding that
efforts to protect species under the Endangered Species Act constitute a taking of property in
violation under the Fifth Amendment); Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (a government-ordered water diversion to protect an endangered fish species under
the ESA may be a physical taking under the Fifth Amendment, requiring government compensation
to holders of private water rights).
306 Ryan, The Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 576–77 (2015).
307 Klein et al., supra note 266, at 408–09.
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after use is subject to subsequent claims enforceable by other users, the
prior appropriation doctrine creates powerful incentives to use as much
as possible, as early as possible—and if you don’t want to be subject to
someone else’s future demands, with as little return to the common pool
as possible.
Some water dependent users and communities have learned this lesson
the hard way. In 1913, for example, as the first coast-to-coast highway
was paved,308 a small Colorado town sued to prevent a hydroelectric
power company from diverting the entirety of a stream that had long
cascaded over a beautiful waterfall through the heart of the town, forming
the basis of its tourism and resort-based economy.309 However, in Empire
Water & Power v. Cascade Town, the Eighth Circuit applied the prior
appropriation doctrine to hold that only the power company had a
protectable water right, because only the power company had made an
actual withdrawal from the stream.310 The town had been relying on the
water for economic purposes even longer, but only by leaving it
instream.311 Thus, the power company could continue to divert water to
its reservoir for economic uses, even though doing so would fully dewater
the Cascade Creek Canyon waterfalls and destroy the longstanding
economic mainstay of the town.312
Just as many riparian rights states are shifting away from the common
law and toward a model of regulated riparianism, most western states
have adopted a regulatory overlay on top of the common law doctrine of
prior appropriations. While these states preserve the temporal priority at
the heart of the common law system, most users beyond a threshold must
now seek state recognition of their rights in an administrative permit.313
Permits are subject to licensing requirements that supplement the
common law approach with new statutory criteria, including a public
interest analysis that requires consideration of factors beyond pure
temporal priority before new rights may be assigned.314 Beginning in the
308 All Things Considered, America’s First Transcontinental Highway Turns 100 (2013),
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/31/242129231/americas-first-transcontinental-highway-turns-100.
309 Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 Fed. 123 (8th Cir. 1913).
310 Id. at 128-129.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 See, e.g., N.D. STATE WATER COMM’N, NORTH DAKOTA’S WATER PERMITTING PROCESS
(Jan. 2018), http://www.swc.nd.gov/pdfs/water_permitting_process.pdf.; Montana Water Use Act,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 (5) (establishing a permit system for obtaining water rights for new
or additional water developments); MINN. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., Water Appropriations Permit
Program, https://www.dnr.state.mn.us/waters/watermgmt_section/appropriations/index.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2015).
314 See, e.g., Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 448-50 (Idaho 1985) (analyzing the public interest
requirements that “appear frequently in the statutes of the prior appropriation states of the West”).
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1970s, most western states have also provided greater statutory
protections for instream flow values—some even approximating public
trust values315—in an attempt to mitigate the enormous pressure to
withdraw from the stream in order to receive a legally protected water
right.316
In this respect, eastern and western states may be converging on a
modern regulatory permit system with a bit more in common than
previous generations. A handful of states, including California, allocate
water under both riparian and appropriative rights regimes
simultaneously, adding further complexity to an already complicated
field.317 And today, water rights in all states are also subject to various
forms of federal regulation, and occasionally to the federal reservation of
water for public and tribal lands (if, following the rule of temporal
priority, the federal lands were reserved for these purposes before later
assertions of private rights).318 However, commentators have pointed out
that the later protections introduced to western water law can be of limited
value in a system that continues to be defined by temporal priority.319 In
most respects, the heart of the western water law analysis remains the
traditional rules of prior appropriations.320 Very few states treat these the

315 See e.g., Steven M. Smith, Instream Flow Right Within Proper Appropriation Doctrine:
Insights from Colorado, 59 NAT. RES. J. 1, 192 (discussing how the Colorado Conservation Board
appropriates “instream water rights on behalf of the public to ‘preserve the natural environment to
a reasonable degree.’”).
316 THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 305, at 215–16.
317 In California, the owners of land abutting watercourses hold some traditional riparian rights,
which coexist with the more abundant appropriative rights that are unconnected to riparian land
ownership but subject to similar requirements of reasonable and beneficial use. See THOMPSON ET
AL., supra note 286, at 200 (discussing California’s hybrid system of water law); see also CAL.
CONST. art. X, § 2 (confirming the protection of riparian rights and discussing the requirement of
beneficial use). However, prior appropriations remains the defining doctrinal approach in the state.
See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 286, at 208 (explaining how the doctrines interact with one
another in California); see also John Franklin Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine and National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court: A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the Consistent Evolution of
California Water Rights, 6 GLENDALE L. REV. 201, 207–09 (1984) (outlining the history of
California’s dual water rights system).
318 See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (creating the doctrine of federal reserved
water rights, which implies such water rights as needed to fulfill the purpose of federal reservations
of land, here Indian reservations, with priority established as of the date of the reservation); United
States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (applying the doctrine to other federal public lands);
see also PETER FOLGER ET AL., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45259, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
GROUNDWATER SUPPLY: OVER AND LEGISLATION IN THE 115TH CONGRESS 3-6 (2018).
319 THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 305, at 215–16.
320 See, e.g., Norman K. Johnson & Charles T. DuMars, A Survey of the Evolution of Western
Water Law in Response to Changing Economic and Public Interest Demands, 29 NAT. RES. J. 347,
367–71 (1989) (considering ramifications of the public trust doctrine for the future of western, prior
appropriations-based water law).
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same way they do conventional appropriations; for example, only three
states allow private parties to hold them.321
C. Private Water Allocation and the Public Trust
Notwithstanding this modern convergence, the emerging variants of
regulated riparian and statutory appropriative rights systems continue to
showcase stark differences, and they each intersect differently with the
public trust doctrine. Even as the public trust doctrine requires the state
to protect navigable waterways in trust for the public, the doctrines of
private water allocation govern how the state gives away the waters
within them. And while the public trust and riparian rights doctrines are
more grounded in a public commons theory of waterways, emphasizing
correlative rights and shared duties, the prior appropriations doctrine
tends toward a privatization model, establishing perpetual first-in-time
rights to exclude others.
Both the public trust and prior appropriation doctrines have deep roots
in state common and statutory law, and the values they protect are
independently legitimate and important. Yet reconciling them is difficult,
because each one operates from a theoretical framework that seemingly
excludes the central premise of the other. If the public trust doctrine
commits the sovereign to maintaining the public commons values of
waterways—from instream uses to ecological benefits—then how should
the law cope with established rights to withdraw water for private use if
they threaten the health of the waterway? If private water law allocates
protectable rights to withdraw water from public sources for private uses,
potentially even protected by the Takings Clause, how should the state
honor its obligations to manage public trust resources for the benefit of
the public, including future generations yet to come?
These contrasting legal frameworks have set in motion a collision that
was inevitable, and that continues to unfold across the American west
even now. The following section explores how it has been managed in
three different western prior appropriations states: California, Idaho, and
Nevada.
1. California: A Balancing Act at Mono Lake and the Scott River.
The unavoidable conflict between the underlying premises of the
public trust and prior appropriations doctrines erupted most spectacularly
in the early 1980s at Mono Lake, an ancient and otherwordly lake that
321 THOMPSON, supra note 305, at 216 (noting that while most states now allow some sort of
appropriation to protect instream flows, only Alaska, Arizona, and Nevada allow private entitles to
claim them).
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drains the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada mountains at Yosemite
National Park. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the
California Supreme Court was tasked with resolving the visceral conflict
between the state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine to protect
Mono Lake, a navigable waterway, and the appropriative rights it had
granted to divert Mono Basin water some 400 miles south to Los
Angeles.322 The resulting decision is among the most important public
trust cases of the modern era, impacting the development of the doctrine
across the nation and the world,323 and so other scholars324 and I have
exhaustively catalogued the Mono Lake story in previous work.325
In a nutshell, the Mono Lake plaintiffs argued that the public trust
doctrine, defining a core requirement of state sovereign ownership of
waterways, should trump any contrary claims under the later law of prior
applications. The City of Los Angeles argued that the prior appropriations
doctrine, an abrogating act of statutory law, should trump any
countervailing common law doctrine.326 Simultaneously affirming and
disappointing the central arguments by both sides, the California
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the prior appropriations statute
did not displace the state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine,327
but neither could the public trust doctrine unwind California’s massive
and entrenched system of statewide water transfers.328 Solomon-like, the

See Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
See ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER ALLOCATION, AND THE
MONO LAKE STORY, Chapter VIII (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2021) (reviewing the
impacts of the case domestically and internationally). For example, the Mono Lake case played a
critical role in the development of the doctrine as a feature of Indian Constitutional law. M.C. Mehta
v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in I UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROJECT
COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED TO THE ENVIRONMENT, NATIONAL
DECISIONS
259
(1998),
http://www.asianjudges.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/Compendium_Judicial_Decisions_Nat_v
1.pdf (discussing the role of the public trust doctrine in Indian law and quoting the California
Supreme Court’s description of the doctrine in Mono Lake).
324 See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 239, at 612–14 (discussing the relationship between the public
trust and prior appropriations doctrines); Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 630–33 (1984) (analyzing
the state court’s reconciliation of the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines in Mono Lake);
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewel, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real
Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y 1177, 1188-95 (2008) (same).
325 See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 1, The Historic Saga; Ryan, supra note 1, From Mono Lake to
the Atmospheric Trust; ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER
ALLOCATION, AND THE MONO LAKE STORY (Cambridge Univ. Press, forthcoming 2021).
326 Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d at 727.
327 Id. at 712.
328 Id. at 712, 727.
322
323
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court announced that neither of the two doctrines trumps the other, and
that the state must somehow find an accommodation between them.329
While the court’s decision emphasized the importance of balancing the
values served by the two different doctrines, the decision broke ground
on multiple points of law, affirming that the public trust doctrine (1)
protects environmental values associated with trust resources, (2) applies
to the non-navigable tributaries of trust resources; (3) creates an ongoing
duty of state supervision, (4) constrains state authority to license water
rights in derogation of trust values, and (5) was neither abrogated by nor
subsumed into California’s statutory system of prior appropriation law.330
After an additional decade of painstaking consultation with scientists and
stakeholders, the State Water Board reissued Los Angeles’s water rights
according to a complex scheme that balanced the legitimate needs of the
City for water against the important public trust values requiring state
protection at Mono Lake.331
The Mono Lake doctrine was recently extended by the California
courts in application to groundwater resources, a realm in which most
states have not fully considered the public trust doctrine. For many years,
agricultural groundwater withdrawals had been depleting the Scott River,
a navigable tributary of the larger Klamath River system.332 In litigation
widely known as the Scott River case, the plaintiffs sought to extend the
logic of the Mono Lake case to this unfamiliar yet parallel context, in
which the public trust values associated with the navigable Scott River
were pitted against established appropriative rights to pump nonnavigable tributary groundwater for agricultural use.333
In 2018, the California Court of Appeals concluded that the public trust
doctrine does protect the Scott River from the diversion of groundwater
tributaries, notwithstanding claimed statutory rights to the water.334 The
court anchored its reasoning in the National Audubon Society decision
protecting Mono Lake, declaring that “[t]he analysis begins and ends with
whether the challenged activity harms a navigable waterway and thereby

329 Id. at 712, 727-28. For fuller analysis of the court’s decision, see Ryan, The Historic Saga,
supra note 1, at 605-11.
330 See Ryan, supra note 1, The Historic Saga, at 605-13; Ryan, supra note 1, From Mono Lake
to the Atmospheric Trust, at 54-55.
331 Mono Lake Basin Water Right Decision 1631, 154-55 (State of Calif. Water Res. Control
Bd. Sept. 28, 1994) (hereinafter Decision 1631); see also Ryan, supra note 1, The Historic Saga,
at 614-15; Ryan, supra note 1, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, at 55-56.
332 Scott River Case, 237 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 397.
333 Id. at 397-98.
334 Id. at 402 (“[T]he water subject to the trust is the Scott River, a navigable waterway . . . [and]
the public trust doctrine applies if extraction of groundwater adversely impacts a navigable
waterway to which the public trust doctrine does apply.’“).
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violates the public trust.”335 It held that the state may not forsake its
obligation to protect a critical public trust commons by allowing private
expropriation, by whatever means.336 Drawing on many of the landmark
public trust decisions reviewed in this Article, it concluded:
What Illinois Central was on the national level in the 19th
century, National Audubon was to California in the 20th
century—a monumental decision enforcing, indeed expanding,
the right of the public to benefit from state-owned navigable
waterways and the duty of the state to protect the public’s
“common heritage” in its water. We reject the County’s effort to
diminish the importance of the opinion, including its mistaken
labeling of its central holdings as dicta. To the contrary, National
Audubon is binding precedent, factually analogous, precisely on
point, and indeed dispositive of the threshold question in this
appeal: does the public trust doctrine apply to the extraction of
groundwater that adversely impacts the Scott River, a navigable
waterway?337

Environmental advocates were elated when the California Supreme Court
declined to hear the matter on appeal, apparently settling the matter at
least with regard to the Scott River. Nevertheless, disputes over the public
trust treatment of groundwater more generally, which is also heavily
regulated by statute in California, are likely to continue.
So, too, will larger disputes over the nature of the public trust doctrine
itself. In addition to deploying the doctrine to protect environmental
values, the Mono Lake and Scott River cases are noteworthy because they
express a powerful view of the public trust doctrine at the level of legal
theory. Following the sovereign constraint theory reviewed in Part
III(C)(3),338 these decisions suggest that the public trust possesses quasiconstitutional features, because in contrast to conventional common law,
it can withstand ordinary abrogation by the legislature.339 In these
disputes, the litigants holding private water rights under state allocation
laws argued that statutorily-based water rights should trump whatever
values the public trust doctrine protects, because (after all) that is

335 Id. at 403; see also id. (adding “the dispositive issue is not the source of the activity, or
whether the water that is diverted or extracted is itself subject to the public trust, but whether the
challenged activity allegedly harms a navigable waterway”).
336 Id. at 401-05.
337 Id. at 401.
338 See supra notes 239-257 and accompanying text (discussing the public trust doctrine as a
constitutive constraint on sovereign authority).
339 See Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56-57 (exploring this
issue in the context of the Mono Lake decision); id. at 58 (noting similar issues at play in the
unfolding Scott River litigation).
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normally how the common law works.340 Judge-made common law is
used to resolve disputes that have not been directly regulated by statute,
but it is generally overridden when the legislature enacts contrary
directives.341 However, the Mono Lake case and its progeny established
that, at least in California, the public trust doctrine was not displaced by
the prior appropriations doctrine, so the state remained obligated to
protect trust values as much as possible while also maintaining its
statutory water allocation system.342
As I have discussed in previous work, the California approach suggests
that the doctrine is best understood “as a constitutive grant of authority
and obligation regarding the management of public commons water
resources,” because it grants sovereign ownership of trust resources while
simultaneously obligating the sovereign to manage them in trust for the
public.343 Because the California doctrine imposes a constraint on
sovereign authority in addition to its sovereign grant, it cannot be
abrogated by simple statute.344 Permitting the state to use its legislative
authority to abolish a foundational constraint on its authority would
undermine the very purpose of the doctrine in protecting public
commons.345 Most American jurisdictions that have addressed the issue
have followed the California approach set forth in the Mono Lake
decision,346 including Hawaii, 347 New Jersey, 348 and Washington, 349 and

Id. at 56.
Id.
342 Mono Lake Case, 658 P.2d at 728.
343 Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56; see also Ryan, The
Historic Saga, supra note 1, at 573-74.
344 But see supra note 138 (discussing the narrow exceptions to the general public trust
constraints stated in Illinois Central).
345 Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56 (noting that “[s]ome
have argued that this interpretation of the public trust doctrine is a necessary implication of the
equal footing doctrine, which is also recognized as a principle of U.S. constitutional law—even
though, like the words “public trust,” the words “equal footing” appear nowhere in the U.S.
Constitution”).
346 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (“The final underpinning
of our formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state’s
sovereign power.”).
347 See In re Water Use Permit Applications for the Waiahole Ditch, 9 P.3d 409, 443 (Haw.
2000) (“[H]istory and precedent have established the public trust as an inherent attribute of
sovereign authority.”).
348 See East Cape May v. State Dept. of Environmental Protection, 777 A.2d 1015, 1034 (N.J.
Super A.D. 2001) (noting that “tidally-flowed land has always been subject to the public trust
doctrine . . . [which] provides that the sovereign never waives its right to regulate the use of public
trust property”).
349 See Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash.2d 662, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (“The state can no more
convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in the
administration of government and the preservation of the peace.’”).
340
341
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those with express constitutional trusts, such as Pennsylvania.350
Nevertheless, at least one other western state, Idaho, has pointedly
rejected it.351
2. Idaho: Legislative Repudiation of the Constitutive Constraint.
In the decade after the Mono Lake decision, the Idaho State Supreme
Court decided several public trust cases converging on the California’s
approach352 when the state legislature intervened with a statute that
expressly foreclosed the court’s apparent interpretive path.353 The
legislation was designed specifically to clarify the scope of the public
trust doctrine, with the apparent target audience of the state’s supreme
court justices.354 While it acknowledged that the doctrine prevents the
state from alienating title to submerged lands,355 it specified that the
doctrine will not impact the allocation of prior appropriative water rights
or other state decisions about the use of public trust waterways for
commercial, agricultural, or recreational uses.356 In other words, the state
legislature formally rejected the California approach before the state
supreme court could fully articulate it. As a result, and in contrast to
California and the other states that follow similar principles, in Idaho, the
prior appropriation doctrine does trump the public trust doctrine.
Environmental scholars quickly condemned the Idaho statute as
illegitimate, 357 but as I have observed in prior work, the legitimacy of the
350 See supra notes 187-198 and accompanying text (discussing the Environmental Rights
Amendment to the Pennsylvania State Constitution).
351 See Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 56-57. The move
prompted considerable scholarly controversy on this issue. See Kearney, supra note 201, at 94;
Blumm et al., supra note 106, at 472 (noting that the new statute “was the legislature’s response to
judicial public trust declarations” in a series of Idaho Supreme Court cases).
352 See Selkirk-Priest Basin Ass’n v. State ex rel. Andrus, 127 Idaho 239, 240, 242-45 (1995)
(suggesting that the public trust doctrine might be used to constrain harm from logging activities to
an impacted water body); Idaho Conservation League v. State, 911 P.2d 748 (Idaho 1995)
(declining intervention by environmental groups to raise public trust issues where state ownership
was not at issue, but suggesting in dicta that the public trust doctrine could take precedence over
vested water rights); see also Kearney, supra note 201, at 95-96 (1997) (discussing these cases and
the legislature’s reaction).
353 IDAHO CODE tit. 58, ch. 12 § 58-1201-1203 (1996) (Chapter 12. Public Trust Doctrine).
354 Id. § 58-1201(6) (clarifying that the purpose of the act is to define limits on the public trust
doctrine).
355 Id. § 58-1201(4) (defining the public trust doctrine as guiding alienation of the title of the
beds of navigable waters; id. § 58-1203(1) (limiting the doctrine to “solely a limitation on the power
of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters”).
356 Id. § 58-1203(3) (clarifying that the doctrine does not limit the state to authorize public and
private use of submerged lands, or even alienation of title to them, if the state land commission
determines that it is in accordance with Idaho statutes and constitution and for the purposes of
navigation, commerce, recreation, agriculture, mining, forestry, or other uses).
357 See, e.g., Kearney, supra note 146; Blumm et al., supra note 106.
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statute really depends on the underlying nature of the public trust
doctrine.358 If the doctrine includes a constitutive limit on sovereign
authority over natural resource public commons, as the California
approach understands it, then the Idaho legislature’s move to abrogate
that limit would indeed exceed the scope of legislative authority at its
disposal.359 Yet the Idaho legislature treated the doctrine as an ordinary
exercise of state authority to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare—the conventional reservoir of police power authority that is
normally subject to legislative adjustment.360 The contest between the
California and Idaho approaches is symptomatic of the variability of the
doctrine among U.S. jurisdictions, but more importantly, it exposes this
core underlying dilemma of legal theory:
Is [the public trust doctrine] a constitutive element of sovereign
authority that cannot be casually dissolved by the one wielding
that sovereign authority at any given moment in time? Or is it an
expression of the state’s conventional police power to protect the
public welfare, which can always be revisited by future
legislative decisionmakers? If we assume that the public trust
doctrine in every state evolved from a single, unified principle,
then the contrary approaches taken by these states pose a thorny
legal problem, because it would seem that they cannot both be
right. Either the doctrine originated as a modifiable expression of
conventional state authority, or it has always been a less
negotiable constraint on sovereign power.
If California is right, then unlike the conventional common law,
the public trust doctrine represents a quasi-constitutional limit on
sovereign authority that cannot be so easily legislated away. But
if Idaho is right, then the doctrine is just another common law rule
that is forever subject to new sovereign consensus. Neither of
these principles can reduce to the other without constitutional
change. The Idaho approach could not legitimately evolve from
the California model, nor could the California approach evolve
from the Idaho model—because either path threatens
conventional rule of law principles. At least in the United States,
sovereign authority cannot free itself of constitutional constraints,
nor does ordinary common law assume constitutive status
through conventional common law processes.361

At the level of legal theory, then, the California and Idaho approaches
are mutually exclusive, and indeed, “neither can reduce to the other
358
359
360
361

See Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 57.
Id.
Id.
Ryan, From Mono Lake to the Atmospheric Trust, supra note 1, at 57.
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without constitutional change.”362 But if both states cannot be right about
the underlying theory of the public trust, then which one got it wrong—
California, or Idaho?
It bears noting that even now, we may not know the end of the story.
In Idaho, the last serious move was made by the legislature, in a
separation-of-powers struggle for interpretive supremacy that could yet
be revisited in court. A plaintiff with standing could still challenge the
legality of the Idaho statute as ultra vires—just like the statute in Illinois
Central—and the high court could decide to hear the case, although that
seems both judicially and politically unlikely at this point in time. And in
California, though the Mono Lake doctrine authorizes the unsettling of
appropriative rights, that power has been virtually unused outside the
Mono Basin, manifesting today much more powerfully in prospective
administrative process than retrospective adjudication.363
In the meanwhile, other states managing the same conflict between the
public trust and prior appropriations doctrines continue to wrestle with
the dilemma in new contexts. In fact, just as this piece goes to press, a
neighboring western state has weighed in with a decision that declines to
cleanly pick one side over the other in the unfolding theoretical fray.
3. Nevada: Mixed Messages in the Walker Lake Basin.
The battle over the underlying legal theory of the public trust was
recently joined by another prior appropriations state, Nevada, in a
decision that draws elements from both the California and Idaho
approaches. The litigation arose over appropriative withdrawals from the
agriculturally important Walker River and their negative impact on
Walker Lake at its terminus, another rare Great Basin lake not far from
Mono Lake across the state line.364 The farming community in Western
Nevada depends on these diversions, but they have caused Walker Lake
to drop 160 vertical feet, increasing salinity and sedimentation, killing off
its fish population, and destroying many of its public recreational and
aesthetic values. 365 Ever since the California decision protecting Mono
Lake, local environmentalists and indigenous people have attempted to
apply the same legal logic to save Walker Lake by curbing upstream

Id.
See Dave Owen, The Mono Lake Case, the Public Trust Doctrine, and the Administrative
State, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1099, 1104–05 (2012).
364 Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., No. 75917, 2020 WL 5849506 (Nev. Sept. 17, 2020).
365 Kyle Roerink, Can Walker River and Walker Lake Live in Harmony, THE SIERRA NEVADA
ALLY (Sep. 29, 2020), https://sierranevadaally.org/2020/09/29/can-walker-river-and-walker-lakelive-in-harmony/ (describing three decades of litigation over conflicting water uses in the Walker
River Basin).
362
363
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appropriative rights to the Walker River.366 Their hopes had been raised
when the Nevada Supreme Court previously recognized the doctrine as
an inherent constraint on the state’s sovereign authority over protected
trust resources, following the first few footholds of the California
approach.367
In Mineral County v. Lyon County, decided late in 2020, the closely
divided court dashed the hopes of these plaintiffs while also confusing
analysists, by a decision with a clearly favorable outcome for
appropriators but a somewhat mixed message for the future.368 The
Nevada Supreme Court doubled down on its Californian view of the
public trust doctrine as a fundamental constraint on state authority, but it
declined to follow the model to the point of unsettling appropriative rights
that were clearly undermining a trust resource.369 Instead, it followed
Idaho’s lead in holding that the public trust doctrine could not dislodge
previously established water rights—but not because, as the Idaho
legislature had reasoned, the public trust does not apply to appropriative
water rights. For the Nevada high court, it was because all water rights
established by state administrative processes had already conformed to
the central public trust requirement that the state manage trust resources
for the public benefit.370
It is a surprising decision—not quite a third way, but perhaps a middle
ground—in that it draws from different elements of the two seemingly
exclusive approaches taken by its neighbors. The court committed to an
expansive reading of state obligations under the public trust doctrine,
affirming application of the doctrine to all waters in the state, including
those that are the subject of prior appropriation, and characterizing the
trust as a constitutive limit on state authority to preserve trust resources
for the public benefit.371 It explicitly recognized the doctrine as a
sovereign constraint and a background principle of state law, writing that
“the public trust doctrine applies to rights already adjudicated and settled
under the doctrine of prior appropriation, such that the doctrine has
always inhered in the water law of Nevada as a qualification or constraint

366

Id.; Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., No. 75917, 2020 WL 5849506, at *2-*3 (Nev. Sept. 17,

2020).
367 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (“The final underpinning of our
formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state’s
sovereign power.”).
368 Mineral Cnty. v. Lyon Cnty., No. 75917, 2020 WL 5849506 (Nev. Sept. 17, 2020); see also
Roerink, supra note 366 (discussing local uncertainty following the decision).
369 Mineral Cnty. V. Lyon Cnty., No. 75917, 2020 WL 5849506, at *3-*5, *9 (Nev. Sept. 17,
2020).
370 Id. at *6, *9.
371 Id. at *3-*5.
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in every appropriated right.”372 Its sweeping endorsement of public trust
principles provides potential fodder for future environmental litigation,
both to fortify challenges against new appropriative rights that threaten
trust values and to defend environmental regulations against takings
challenges by invoking the trust as a background principle of state law.
Nevertheless, the court declined to second-guess the challenged
appropriative rights in the Walker Lake basin on grounds that they were
allocated under water statutes that are already consistent with the public
trust doctrine, and so everything that follows from them must also be
so.373 In a three-two split, the majority held that Nevada’s comprehensive
system of water laws satisfy the state’s public trust obligations because
they were carefully designed to “constrain water allocations based on the
public interest,” and they meet all criteria for “the dispensation of public
trust property” that the court had previously established.374 Over a lively
dissent, the justices in the majority acknowledged the grave threats to
trust values at Walker Lake, but concluded that they could not grant the
relief the plaintiffs sought:
[W]hile we are sympathetic to the plight of Walker Lake and the
resulting negative impacts on the wildlife, resources, and
economy in Mineral County, we cannot use the public trust
doctrine as a tool to uproot an entire water system, particularly
where finality is firmly rooted in our statutes. We cannot read into
the statutes any authority to permit reallocation when the
Legislature has already declared that adjudicated water rights are
final, nor can we substitute our own policy judgments for the
Legislature’s.375

While recognizing “the tragic decline of Walker Lake” and the associated
environmental and economic harms to the surrounding community,376
these justices reasoned that all established water rights satisfy the public
trust doctrine by definition, because consideration of public trust values
is built into the water allocation system itself.377 If the rights were granted,
goes the logic, the public trust must have been adequately considered, and
values of finality must prevail.
Though finality is a legitimately important value in dispute resolution,
the majority’s reasoning here is confusing, given that the modern public
trust doctrine was not given clear consideration in Nevada until this very

372
373
374
375
376
377

Id. at *5.
Id. at *6, *9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *6, *9.
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Walker Lake dispute first arose thirty years ago—when the appropriative
rights at issue had already been granted.378 Indeed, although it recognized
the public trust as an inherent limitation on state sovereign power
predating its holding, the Nevada Supreme Court only formally adopted
the doctrine in 2011,379 nine years before holding here that all established
water rights satisfy the state’s trust obligations because the obliged
considerations are built into the state’s administrative process. The timing
alone makes this proposition troubling. It is one thing to hold that trust
values are accounted for on the front end through an administrative
process designed to do so—as, for example, California’s process
arguably does today.380 But the majority’s argument here seems
conveniently disinterested in genuine consideration of whether Nevada’s
administrative process matches the gravity that the rest of its decision
places on the state’s public trust obligations—especially administrative
process that took place before the these obligations were formally
recognized. The decline of Walker Lake may not be determinative of such
a failing, but it is at the very least suggestive of it.
To that end, and writing for the remaining members of the court, the
Chief Justice concurred in the parts of the decision expansively
interpreting the Nevada public trust doctrine, but dissented vigorously
from the conclusion that appropriative rights threatening trust resources
could not be revisited.381 He contended that the majority “fundamentally
misapprehends the public trust doctrine and its constitutional and
sovereign dimensions,” invoking the California view of the constitutive
nature of the doctrine while supporting his argument with references to
the Nevada State Constitution and other expressions of state law.382 He
repeatedly referenced the Mono Lake decision in arguing that the public
trust doctrine and private water allocation laws must be understood as
independently functioning parts of the state’s comprehensive water
management system that must be balanced against one another.383 In his
view, and following the California approach, both the public trust and
378 Mineral Cnty. v. State, 20 P.3d 800, 807 (Nev. 2001) (en banc) (Rose, J., concurring) (in an
earlier iteration of the Walker Lake dispute, urging the Nevada Supreme Court to clarify the scope
of the doctrine in Nevada); see also Jason L. DeForest, Lawrence v. Clark County and Nevada’s
Public Trust Doctrine: Reconsidering Water Rights in the Desert, 13 NEVADA L.J. 290, 297-99
(2012) (discussing the early history of the public trust doctrine in Nevada).
379 Lawrence v. Clark Cnty., 254 P.3d 606, 613 (Nev. 2011) (“The final underpinning of our
formal adoption of the public trust doctrine arises from the inherent limitations on the state’s
sovereign power.”).
380 See generally Owen, supra note 364 (considering the role of the public trust doctrine in the
administration of California water rights).
381 Id. at *12-*14 (Pickering, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
382 Id. at *14.
383 Id. at *14-*17.
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prior appropriations doctrines provide independent sources of regulatory
value, both more important than finality, and neither doctrine can
subsume or replace the contributions of the other.384
If the battle over Walker Lake continues after this decision, it will
certainly be an uphill one for these plaintiffs. Nevertheless, while the
court rejected the remedy they sought, its affirmation that public trust
principles must undergird the state’s water allocation laws may provide
legal impetus for the State Engineer to act to protect threatened trust
resources like Walker Lake through administrative means—perhaps by
encouraging state actors to free up additional water resources through
conservation, where possible, or other means that do not disrupt
established appropriations. That’s no small task in a state as dry as
Nevada, but the parts of the decision that reinforce the breadth of state
obligations under the doctrine provide greater legal and political cover
for such moves than was available beforehand.
These fascinating doctrinal developments from Nevada highlight the
ongoing debate in the western United States about the nature of the public
trust doctrine and its relationship to the prior appropriations doctrine in
the administration of water resources. The Walker Lake decision is newly
released as this Article goes to press, but it has already received criticism
by neutral commentators for failing to clarify the law.385 The decision
confirms the constitutive nature of the public trust and its foundational
role in the state’s water management system, but disempowers it by
holding it subsumed into statutory allocation laws, on a shaky
presumption that all allocations were made faithfully to the state’s trust
obligations. In this regard, the Nevada approach seems to occupy a mushy
midpoint between the warmer embrace of the doctrine in California and
the colder renunciation of its force in Idaho.
The Walker Lake decision further highlights the difficulty of
navigating the conflicting values in these cases—the environmental
values that the California Supreme Court defended at Mono Lake, the
economic interests that the legislature championed in Idaho, and the
issues of finality, state obligations, and separation of powers with which
the members of the Nevada Supreme Court so passionately wrestled. As
the majority warned, securing finality in the assignment of rights is a
critical value in implementing a regulatory system founded on scarcity,

Id. at *15.
Kyle Roerink, Can Walker River and Walker Lake Live in Harmony, THE SIERRA NEVADA
ALLY (Sep. 29, 2020), at https://sierranevadaally.org/2020/09/29/can-walker-river-and-walkerlake-live-in-harmony/ (noting that “the State Supreme Court’s majority opinion has left
considerable uncertainty for communities and more paperwork for water attorneys”).
384
385
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like the prior appropriations doctrine.386 And yet as the dissent intoned,
“it cannot be that this state’s affirmative fiduciary obligations over certain
water sources—obligations supervised by the judiciary and founded on a
century of common law, inherent sovereign authority, and the state
constitution—are entirely subsumed by a handful of statutes governing
the specific duties of an administrative agent.”387
Each of the cases from these states distills the conflict set in motion by
the independent development of these two separate aspects of water law:
the public trust doctrine’s affirmation of public rights in waterways and
the prior appropriations doctrine’s affirmation of private rights to use of
the water in those waterways.388 Writ large, these stories also represent
the conflict between environmental protection and economic
development.389 And the clash between biocentric and anthropocentric
environmental ethics, raised by the conflict between in-basin
environmental values and the utilitarian needs of vast urban publics in
distant places, and agricultural enterprises that feed the nation.390 And the
separation of powers among the three branches of government, and
doubtlessly others as well. These stories show how these two doctrines
continue to create legal friction—but perhaps necessary friction, as we
continue to struggle toward the uneasy, perhaps constantly shifting
equipoise between legitimately conflicting values.
CONCLUSION
Understanding the history of the public trust doctrine provides
important foundation for using the doctrine today to respond to
contemporary legal conflicts and, better still, prevent them in the first
place. It also enables us to better analyze the unresolved relationship
between the public trust doctrine and adjacent doctrines of private water
Id. at *9.
Id. at *15.
388 See Stevens, supra note 225, at 612–14 (discussing the relationship between the public trust
and prior appropriations doctrines); Timothy J. Conway, National Audubon Society v. Superior
Court: The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 630–33 (1984) (analyzing the state
court’s reconciliation of the public trust and prior appropriations doctrines in Mono Lake); Craig
Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewel, Litigation’s Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public
Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
1177, 1188-95 (2008) (same).
389 See Brian E. Gray, Ensuring the Public Trust, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 973, 974 (2012)
(discussing Mono Lake’s establishment of an environmental baseline in the management of public
resources that exists in tension with continuing “economic and political pressures to expand
existing water projects or to develop new sources.”).
390 Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono
Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 577–82 (1995) (discussing competing interests in the
Water Board’s reallocation decision-making process following the Mono Lake decision).
386
387
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allocation—riparian rights and prior appropriations—that complicates
modern water management in the United States. This Article has traced
the development of public trust principles from the progenitors of western
law to the present United States, showing the evolution of the doctrine
from an affirmation of sovereign authority over public natural resource
commons to a recognition of sovereign responsibility to protect them for
present and future generations.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that similar public trust principles
appear in legal systems throughout the world, including India, South
Africa, Pakistan, Kenya, Brazil, and Canada.391 Variations on the idea that
people hold rights in natural resource commons have developed in
numerous ancient legal systems simultaneously and independently. For
example, the Ottoman Civil Code, known as the Mejelle, details a related
list of public commons resources that are free and open to all, including
not only water, seas and large lakes, and certain rivers, but also fire,
grasses, certain trees and mushrooms, and all wild game.392 At the same
time, related principles are developing in parallel ethical frameworks,
such as the Rights of Nature movement that locates environmental rights
directly in the natural systems that would benefit from protection, rather
than the people who benefit from those natural systems.393 In contrast to

391 See e.g., M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 S.C.C. 388 (1996) (India), in 1 UNITED
NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROJECT COMPENDIUM OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS IN MATTERS RELATED
TO
THE
ENVIRONMENT,
NATIONAL
DECISIONS
259,
269-70
(1998),
https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/25379 (citing Illinois Central, Mono Lake, and
Joseph Sax in establishing the public trust doctrine as “the law of the land”); see also Michael C.
Blumm & Rachel D. Guthrie, Internationalizing the Public Trust Doctrine: Natural Law and
Constitutional and Statutory Approaches to Fulfilling the Saxion Vision, 45 CAL. DAVIS L. REV.
742, 760 (2012) (reviewing the impact of the public trust doctrine internationally); ERIN RYAN,
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER ALLOCATION, AND THE MONO LAKE STORY,
Chapter VIII (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 2021) (discussing examples of public trust
principles in operation around the globe).
392 See AL-MAJALLA AL AHKAM AL ADALIYYAH (The Ottoman Courts Manual
(Hanafi)), Book X: Joint Ownership; Chapter IV: Jointly Owned Property Which Is Free, art. 1234
et seq., https://www.iium.edu.my/deed/lawbase/al_majalle/al_majalleb10.html. In 1962, an Israeli
court drew on the Mejelle to apply public trust-like principles in a case affirming public rights to
access beaches, overturning the conviction of Moshe Puterman for trespassing on a public beach.
CrimA (TA) 851/60 Puterman v. AG, PM 30, 7 (1962). For discussion of the case and the role of
Ottoman law in the court’s decision, see David Schor, The Israeli (and Ottoman and Islamic) Public
Trust
Doctrine,
ENVIRONMENT,
LAW,
AND
HISTORY
(July
13,
2016),
https://environmentlawhistory.blogspot.com/2016/07/the-israeli-and-ottoman-and-islamic.html
(discussing the case and the role of Article 1234, et seq., of the Ottomon Civil Code); Zafrir Rinat,
Thanks to This Man, You Don’t Have to Pay to Go to the Beach in Israel, HAARETZ (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium.MAGAZINE-this-man-is-the-reason-why-israelibeach-entry-is-free-1.5387797 (describing the case and the Mejelle doctrine it applied).
393 See, e.g., Craig Kauffman, Constructing Rights of Nature Norms in the US, Ecuador, and
New Zealand, 18 Global Envtl. Politics 43 (2018); Meredith N. Healy, Fluid Standing:

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648637

206

Virginia Environmental Law Journal

[Vol. 38:2

the public trust doctrine, which effectively creates positive environmental
rights in citizens, the Rights of Nature approach deprivileges human
needs in asserting the independent rights of ecosystems and their
components to exist and to thrive.394 The Rights of Nature movement thus
provides an unapologetically biocentric alternative to the inherent
anthropocentrism of both the public trust doctrine and U.S. water
allocation laws, which both locate rights to environmental protection and
natural resource commons in the people who benefit from them.395
Even as the public trust doctrine requires the state to protect navigable
waterways in trust for the public, however, the doctrines of private water
allocation—especially Western prior appropriations—govern how the
state gives away the waters within them. Unlike the correlative,
indeterminate rights associated with eastern riparian rights, the perpetual,
excludable use rights associated with western prior appropriations system
are theoretically absolute. A conflict between the public trust doctrine and
private water allocation law was perhaps inevitable, especially in the arid
West, because states there apply a privatization model to allocating rights
to take water from waterways at the very same time that they apply a
public commons approach to protect the underlying waterways. Different
states, such as California, and Idaho, have taken distinct legal paths in
reconciling these conflicts, while others, such as Nevada, are still charting
a clear course.
Conflicts between public and private claims on water resources and
other natural resource commons will doubtlessly continue to drive the
evolution of all relevant systems of law, just as new principles of
environmental rights, such as the Rights of Nature movement, emerge to
challenge the dominant theoretical models of both systems. The dynamic
co-evolution of public trust principles and rules of private allocation,
resource conservation and resource exploitation, environmental
protection and natural resource management, will surely continue—not
only in substance but at the level of legal theory, where there is clearly
much work left to do.

Incorporating the Indigenous Rights of Nature Concept into Collaborative Management of the
Colorado River Ecosystem, 30 Colo. Nat. Resources, Energy & Envtl. L. Rev. 327 (2019).
394 See Erin Ryan, Holly Curry, & Hayes Rule, Environmental Rights, the Public Trust Doctrine
and the Rights of Nature Movement, 42 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing
constitutional, statutory, and local provisions conferring legal personhood on ecosystems, rivers,
and even wild rice); see also ERIN RYAN, THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE, PRIVATE WATER
ALLOCATION, AND THE MONO LAKE STORY, Chapter VIII (Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming, 2021).
395 See sources cited supra note 394.
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